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Casenotes and Comments
THE FDA, CONGRESS, AND MOBILE HEALTH APPS: LESSONS
FROM DSHEA AND THE REGULATION OF DIETARY
SUPPLEMENTS
NATALIE R. BILBROUGH *
Within the past few years, the mobile health applications (“apps”) 1
industry has exploded, with the number of available apps surpassing
100,000. 2 One study shows that by 2018, more than half of the 3.4 billion
smartphone and tablet users will have downloaded a mobile health app.3
The sheer scope of mHealth, 4 and particularly mobile health apps, presents
exciting possibilities for public health, but also formidable obstacles for the

© 2015 Natalie R. Bilbrough.
*
J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Professor Frank Pasquale for his inspiration and her many editors,
particularly Alyssa Domzal and Christopher Chaulk, for their thoughtful dedication throughout
this process. She also wants to thank her extended family and especially her husband, Brian
Bilbrough, for their encouragement, patience, and love. Finally, she dedicates this Comment to
the Honorable Diane Leasure in appreciation for her support for her students.
1. A mobile app is “a software application that can be executed (run) on a mobile
platform . . . or a web-based software application that is tailored to a mobile platform but is
executed on a server.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS 7 (2015), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/UCM263366.pdf [hereinafter MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE]. For purposes of this
Comment, a “mobile health app” refers generally to any mobile apps that have a health, wellness,
or medical function, and should not be confused with “mobile medical apps,” a term used by the
FDA to designate a narrower class of mobile health apps. Id. at 4. For a description of the history
of mobile apps, see Alex Krouse, Note, iPads, iPhones, Androids, and Smartphones: FDA
Regulation of Mobile Phone Applications as Medical Devices, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 731, 733–
35 (2012).
2. RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, MHEALTH APP DEVELOPER ECONOMICS 2014: THE STATE OF
ART
OF
MHEALTH
APP
PUBLISHING
7
(2014),
available
at
THE
http://research2guidance.com/r2g/mHealth-App-Developer-Economics-2014.pdf.
3. Health Information Technologies: Administration Perspectives on Innovation and
Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 13–14 (2013) (statement of Christy L. Foreman, Director,
FDA
Office
of
Device
Evaluation),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm344395.htm [hereinafter Statement of Christy L.
Foreman].
4. mHealth is “the delivery of healthcare services via mobile communication devices.”
Carol E. Torgan, The mHealth Summit: Local & Global Converge, KINETICS (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.caroltorgan.com/mhealth-summit/.
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federal agencies charged with protecting consumers. 5 Given that many
mobile health apps are not developed with professional medical input, the
risks of malfunction or erroneous health advice are great.6 For these
reasons and others, physicians and other health care providers have
generally been reluctant to incorporate mobile health apps and other types
of mHealth into their practices.7
Recognizing the need for some measure of oversight, the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) released a guidance document in September
2013 proposing a risk-based approach in which the FDA would actively
regulate only a smaller subset of mobile health apps. 8 According to the
guidance document, the FDA will regulate only “mobile medical apps”
(“MMAs”), which are mobile apps that meet “the definition of a device
under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act”
(“FDCA”). 9 However, some stakeholders, scholars, and members of
Congress consider FDA interference in this area to be unwarranted or ill-

5. See, e.g., Nathan G. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, 4
NEW ENG. J. MED. 371, 372–75 (2014), available at http://www.law.smu.edu/getmedia/c5412c9eb58b-4461-a725-f900ddf56127/Nathan-Cortez—NEJM-article-072414 (discussing ways to
realize the promise of mobile health technologies but also analyzing the challenges of applying the
FDA’s current medical device regulatory framework to mobile health technology); Nicolas P.
Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13 NEV. L.J. 722, 724 (2013)
(arguing that mobile health apps are “the first major success story of health care disruption by IT
because they can disorder the high friction, embedded cost of location-specific medicine with a
new model of ‘health care everywhere’”); SARAH FELLAY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,
CHANGING THE RULES OF HEALTH CARE: MOBILE HEALTH AND CHALLENGES FOR REGULATION
7–9 (2014), available at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/-fellaychanging-therules-of-health-care_100901289367.pdf (critiquing the inadequacies of the FDA’s approval
process as applied to health software).
6. Pamela Lewis Dolan, What’s Missing from Many Health Apps—Medical Expertise,
AMEDNEWS.COM
(May
13,
2013),
http://www.amednews.com/article/20130513/business/130519995/6/ (citing a study conducted at
Ohio State University which found that a third of the pain-related apps evaluated had no input
from a healthcare professional). App providers such as Apple and Google may ban certain apps,
but they do not certify the accuracy or health safety of mobile health apps. Samuel J. Dayton,
Note, Rethinking Health App Regulation: The Case for Centralized FDA Voluntary Certification
of Unregulated Non-Device Mobile Health Apps, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 713, 715–16 (2014).
7. See Dayton, supra note 6, at 721–22. Seventy-three percent of doctors do not suggest
mobile health apps to patients and 13% discourage them. Id. One doctor claimed, “I would never
see a patient and make a decision based solely on the records on their phone . . . maybe in 10
years.” Carl Franzen, Side Effects May Vary: The Growing Problem of Unregulated Medical
Apps, THE VERGE 7 (June 3, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/3/4380244/how-shouldmedical-apps-be-regulated.
8. MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 1, 4. This document was updated in
February 2015 to be consistent with changes made to the regulation of medical device data
systems, but most of the document is identical to the 2013 version. Compare id., with Mobile
Medical Applications; Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff;
Availability, 78 Fed. Reg. 59038 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013).
9. Id. at 4.
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fitting. 10 In 2013 and 2014, several members of Congress proposed bills to
amend the FDCA, 11 the source of the FDA’s authority to regulate medical
devices, by excluding certain types of software used in MMAs from the
FDA’s jurisdiction. 12
The FDA faced a similar situation in the early 1990s with the dietary
supplement industry. 13 After an outbreak of supplement-related deaths, the
FDA suggested stricter regulation of dietary supplements. 14 In response,
Congress, spurred by a powerful, industry-driven, lobbying campaign,
enacted the Dietary Supplement Health and Safety Act of 1994
(“DSHEA”), 15 which mandated a new, less stringent, regulatory framework
for dietary supplements. 16 This congressional preemption of FDA authority
hampered the FDA’s ability to keep harmful dietary supplements from
reaching consumers while simultaneously allowing even more quasipharmaceutical substances on the market.17
Now the question arises: is the FDA again in danger of “being
DSHEA’ed”? 18 The FDA and Congress should avoid a repeat of the dietary
supplement saga and also draw lessons from the regulatory approach in that
field. 19 The field of mobile health apps may be the most disruptive and
important development in the health care sector in decades, so it is
imperative that consumers can trust the mHealth market and rely on the
FDA to protect consumers from faulty or dangerous mobile medical apps. 20

10. See, e.g., Vincent J. Roth, The mHealth Conundrum: Smartphones & Mobile Medical
Apps—How Much FDA Medical Device Regulation Is Required?, 15 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 359, 370
(2014) (determining that the growth of mHealth necessitates a new, streamlined regulatory process
that avoids the current regulatory pitfalls that impede innovation); Sen. Deb Fischer & Sen. Angus
King, FDA’s Slow Process Hurts Innovation: Column, USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/02/15/fischer-king-health-informationtechnology/5464693/ (expressing concern that the FDA’s slow, “heavy-handed” regulatory efforts
will delay technological development of beneficial mobile health apps).
11. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012).
12. See infra Part I.A.3.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690, 33,697 (proposed June 18,
1993) (highlighting the new-found risks associated with certain dietary supplements and
proposing that they be regulated as drugs).
15. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat.
4325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
16. See infra Parts I.B.2–3.
17. See infra Part I.B.3.
18. Margaret Gilhooley, Deregulation and the Administrative Role: Looking at Dietary
Supplements, 62 MONT. L. REV. 85, 89 (2001). In her article, Professor Gilhooley raised the
possibility of DSHEA-like congressional deregulation in areas other than dietary supplements and
suggested that this prospect may influence the FDA to collaborate more with regulated entities.
Id.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 372 (insisting FDA oversight is important to help
patients and doctors evaluate the usefulness and quality of mobile health apps); Terry, supra note
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Instead of preempting the FDA in the mobile health app field,
Congress should enable the FDA to form an internal sub-agency of experts
in mobile technology—the Office of mHealth. 21 This team of experts
should spearhead the FDA’s efforts to regulate mobile health apps,
coordinate with other federal agencies, and initiate precedent-making
enforcement actions.22 By leveraging this expertise, the FDA can be a more
efficient regulator in a developing area of healthcare that is in desperate
need of guidance. 23
I. BACKGROUND
Mobile health apps present novel benefits yet also new dangers to
consumers and patients. 24 Without effective regulation, the mobile health
app world could quickly turn into a market for “digital snake oil,” making it
difficult for consumers or physicians to trust an otherwise useful
technological development.25 Even worse, malfunctioning apps could lead
to serious physical harm. 26 After receiving stakeholder input, the FDA
released a guidance document in 2013 outlining its intended approach to
regulate certain “mobile medical apps.”27 However, the FDA faced
opposition from industry players and members of Congress who wished to
delay FDA action and limit the FDA’s influence on the mobile health app
field. 28
Wishing to proceed with caution in a new field while also pleasing
diverse stakeholders, the FDA continues to recalculate and redefine its role
regulating mobile health apps.29
The current state of regulatory
5, at 757–58 (claiming mobile health apps are the exception to HIT’s general failure to disrupt
health care).
21. See infra Part II.C.1.
22. See infra Part II.C.1.
23. See infra Part II.C.2.
24. See infra Part I.A.1.
25. See Nathan Cortez, The FDA Needs to Regulate “Digital Snake Oil,” SLATE (Sept. 24,
2013),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/24/mhealth_fda_needs_to_regulate_digital_sna
ke_oil.html (comparing ineffective health apps to snake oil and arguing that Congress should
empower the FDA to regulate mHealth in order to boost consumer confidence and further
innovation).
26. See infra Part I.A.1.
27. See MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 4. The FDA received over 130
comments in response to the draft of the MMA Guidance. See Examining Federal Regulation of
Mobile Medical Apps and Other Health Software: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of Jeffrey Shuren,
Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.), available at
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm375462.htm [hereinafter Statement of Jeffrey
Shuren].
28. See infra Part I.A.3.
29. See infra Part I.A.2.
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uncertainty 30 in the mobile health app landscape parallels another time of
upheaval when Congress rejected the FDA’s proposed limitations on
dietary supplements two decades ago. 31 Thus an understanding of the
enactment and consequences of the Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act of 1994 (“DSHEA”) can aid the discussion of possible
solutions for the regulation of mobile health apps. 32
A. The FDA’s Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps and Congressional
Response
Although the FDA regulated mobile health apps before 2013, the
dramatic increase in availability and use of mobile health apps led the FDA
to more formally define its regulatory approach to those apps. 33 The FDA
revealed its intended regulatory strategy in two sources: the Mobile Medical
Application Guidance (2013) and the Food and Drug Administration Safety
and Innovation Act Health IT Report 34 (“FDASIA Health IT Report”)
(2014), which further outlines the agency’s goals for regulating health
information technology (“HIT”), including mobile health apps.35 Although
some stakeholders responded positively to FDA participation, 36 others,
including members of both houses of Congress, envisioned a more limited
role for the FDA, evidenced by three proposed statutes: the Medical
Electronic Data Technology Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act of
2014 (“MEDTECH Act”), 37 the Preventing Regulatory Overreach to
Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014 (“PROTECT Act”), 38 and the
Sensible Oversight for Technology which Advances Regulatory Efficiency
Act of 2013 (“SOFTWARE Act”). 39 All of these proposed statutes suggest
30. See, e.g., Letter from Access Integrity et al. to Congress, 1 (Oct. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.healthitnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Multi-Group-FDASIA-Letter-toCongress.pdf (“We are concerned that there is significant confusion in the market about what
technologies may be regulated, by which agencies, and to what standards.”).
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See Statement of Christy L. Foreman, supra note 3, at 17.
34. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., FDASIA HEALTH IT REPORT: PROPOSED STRATEGY
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A RISK-BASED FRAMEWORK 3 (2014), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/
CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM391521.pdf [hereinafter FDASIA HEALTH IT REP.].
35. See infra Part I.A.2.
36. For example, Omri Shor, the CEO of MediSafe Project, which sells a medication
reminder app, anticipated that the FDA would “take away a lot of the crap that’s in the space.”
Franzen, supra note 7.
37. Medical Electronic Data Technology Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act, S. 2977,
113th Cong. (2014).
38. Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007,
113th Cong. (2014).
39. Sensible Oversight for Technology which Advances Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013,
H.R. 3303, 113th Cong. (2013).
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amending the FDCA to remove certain types of software used in mobile
health apps from the FDA’s jurisdiction. 40
1.

What Are Mobile Health Apps and Why Should They Be
Regulated?

Mobile health apps are quickly becoming the darling of the HIT world
with major tech companies investing in mHealth products such as
wearables. 41 Some mobile health apps allow users to have more control
over their own health and wellbeing, while others act as useful tools for
medical professionals. 42
Ranging from calorie counters to mobile
ultrasound imaging devices, the wide-ranging capabilities of mobile health
apps are astounding. 43 While the potential benefits and uses of mobile
health apps are many, they are beyond the scope of this Comment. 44
Mobile health apps also pose significant risks. 45 Unlike traditional
medical devices marketed to and used primarily by trained medical
professionals, mobile health apps are widely available to the average
consumer who likely has limited medical knowledge.46 Consumer access to
MMAs through smartphones, tablets, and other mobile platforms continues

40. See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text.
41. See Krouse, supra note 1, at 740 (discussing the large corporations such as Verizon,
AT&T, and Apple, that have invested in medical technologies); cf. Mike Feibus, 2015: The Year
TODAY
(Jan.
5,
2015),
of
Health
Care
for
Wearables,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2015/01/02/wearables-fitness-is-name-of-thegame-but-healthcare-is-where-its-at/21190395/ (predicting that apps and wearables will become
more oriented toward healthcare, rather than fitness, in the coming year).
42. See RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 7 (“Today’s mHealth app publishers and
Wannabes predominantly target chronically ill patients (31%) and health and fitness-interested
people (28%). As primary users, physicians are targeted by 14% of app developers.”).
43. See, e.g., Katie Matlack, 5 Medical Peripherals for the iPad or iPhone, THE PROFITABLE
PRACTICE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://profitable-practice.softwareadvice.com/5-medical-peripheralsfor-the-ipad-or-iphone-1012612/ (describing the MobiUS SP1 Ultrasound Imaging Device, a
portable ultrasound device that connects to a phone or other mobile platform to scan and send
images). Another example is the iPhoneECG Electrocardiogram, an app that uses electrodes built
into a smartphone cover that you can place on your heart or finger to record and transmit data into
the smartphone to later send to an expert to analyze. Id. For a description of the different
categories of mobile health apps, see Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1173, 1182–90 (2014).
44. For a discussion of the benefits of mobile health apps see Cortez, supra note 43, at 1190–
1200.
45. See MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 6–7 (“As is the case with
traditional medical devices, certain mobile medical apps can pose potential risks to public
health.”).
46. See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1187–88 (“Notably, many customizer apps generally target
medical professionals and students, though nothing prevents lay users from downloading them.”);
Dayton, supra note 6, at 721–22 (citing study that found that fifty-nine percent of mobile health
users said apps and other mobile technologies have replaced visits to health care providers,
suggesting increased vulnerability to inaccurate or deceptive mobile health apps).
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to increase, creating heightened opportunities for both risks and benefits.47
Not all apps present the same level of risk. 48 An app that tracks a runner’s
steps may not pose a significant health risk if it makes a mistake, but an app
that acts as the “central command” for a glucose meter for a diabetic patient
may have deadly consequences were it to malfunction. 49 Similarly, an app
that functions as a medical device normally only found in a hospital may
pose more risk to an untrained consumer than a health clinician who is
trained to use that sort of a device. 50 Without the need for a prescription or
professional input, mobile apps provide health advice and treatment to
consumers in an unregulated space. 51 Indeed, this ease of access is one of
the benefits of mobile health apps, but also one of its dangers.52
Many apps are developed without any clinician or expert input, posing
the risk of erroneous or malfunctioning apps that may harm patients.53
“‘Virtually any app that claims it will cure someone of a disease, condition
or mental health condition is bogus,’ says John Grohol, an expert in online
health technology, pointing out that the vast majority of apps have not been
scientifically tested.” 54 According to Morgan Reed, the Executive Director
47. See Roth, supra note 10, at 364–65, 415–18 (identifying a phenomenon called
“marketplace interposition” which “occurs where commerce (in this case technological
advancement) encourages society to tacitly permit self-treatment and the unauthorized practice of
medicine through consumer access and actual use” and using that phenomenon to explain the risks
of the consumer-focused aspect of the mobile health app market).
48. See Statement of Jeffrey Shuren, supra note 27, at 12 (“While many mobile apps carry
minimal or no risk to patients, a small subset of these apps can pose significant risks to patients if
they don’t operate correctly.”).
49. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA NEWS RELEASE, FDA ISSUES FINAL GUIDANCE
MOBILE
MEDICAL
APPS
(2013),
available
at
ON
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm369431.htm
(discussing
the different levels of risk presented by different mobile health apps).
50. See Morgan Reed, Exec. Dir. of ACT, Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed RiskBased Regulatory Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 21 (May 13,
available
at
2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (“So, the exact same sensor, the same functionality, the same capability in different hands
has different implications to the patient safety and to improving patient outcomes.”).
51. Roth, supra note 10, at 415 (finding that the marketplace is “rejecting the federal
prohibition against self-treatment” and “state prohibition of the unauthorized practice of
medicine”).
52. See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1178–79 (arguing that the benefits of mobile health apps,
such as their consumer focus, will not reach their full potential unless the apps are “subjected to a
healthy dose of skepticism from federal regulators”).
53. See Thomas Lorchan Lewis & Jeremy C. Wyatt, mHealth and Mobile Medical Apps: A
Framework to Assess Risk and Promote Safer Use, 16 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 210 (2014),
available at http://www.jmir.org/2014/9/e210/ (“[M]any app developers have little or no formal
medical training and do not involve clinicians in the development process and may therefore be
unaware of patient safety issues raised by inappropriate app content or functioning.”).
54. Rochelle Sharpe, Many Health Apps Are Based on Flimsy Science at Best, and They
POST
(Nov.
12,
2012),
Often
Do
Not
Work,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/many-health-apps-are-based-on-flimsy-
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of ACT, an app-developer association, 55 the thousands of apps that make
these types of claims set “a really dangerous expectation that this device
will cure you.” 56 This type of misinformation may lead users to not seek
medical help even when it is desperately needed. 57
Even when apps are developed with adequate professional input,
malfunctions are still a real danger.58 For example, in 2011, Pfizer
conducted a voluntary recall for its rheumatoid arthritis calculator app
because it gave faulty results. 59 And in 2012, Sanofi Aventis voluntarily
recalled its Diamago diabetes app through an Apple “push notification”
because of a software error that could cause the app to “miscalculate an
insulin dose potentially resulting in dangerously low or high blood glucose
levels in diabetic patients.” 60 In February 2010, the FDA revealed it had
reports of 260 malfunctions, 44 injuries, and 6 deaths related to HIT, which,
although not entirely attributable to mobile health apps, illustrate the
potential and indeed, real, risks of software-enabled medical devices.61
Still, the push for medical clinicians to incorporate mobile
technologies and mobile health apps into their practices is increasing. 62 Dr.
Peter Pronovost, the senior vice president for patient safety and quality for

science-at-best-and-they-often-do-not-work/2012/11/12/11f2eb1e-0e37-11e2-bd1ab868e65d57eb_story.html. One study found that a significant percentage of therapeutic apps
tested relied on a cellphone’s sounds, light, or phone vibrations for treatments—all methods which
scientists claim are useless in treating the intended conditions. Id.
55. ACT | The App Association is “an international grassroots advocacy and education
organization representing more than 5,000 small and mid-size app developers and information
technology firms.” ACT | THE APP ASSOCIATION, http://actonline.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 4,
2015).
56. Reed, supra note 50, at 40.
57. See Statement of Jeffrey Shuren, supra note 27, at 12 (“An inaccurate or malfunctioning
mobile medical app that uses a sensor to diagnose skin cancer or to measure critically low blood
oxygen levels in chronic lung disease patients, could delay lifesaving diagnosis and treatment.”).
58. See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 373 (giving examples of apps that have been recalled
due to malfunctions). During 2014, the FDA recalled at least five medical devices involving
software, including an ARKON Anesthesia Delivery System with 2.0 Software (software defect
caused system to stop working) and a Puritan Bennett 840 Series Ventilator (software problem).
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2014 MEDICAL DEVICE RECALLS, available at
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/ListofRecalls/ucm384921.htm (last updated Mar. 5,
2015).
59. Veronica Hackethal, 10 Top Mobile Apps for Rheumatoid Arthritis, RHEUMATOLOGY
NETWORK (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.rheumatologynetwork.com/rheumatoid-arthritis/10-topmobile-apps-rheumatoid-arthritis.
60. Cortez, supra note 43, at 1210 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., CLASS 2 RECALL: SANOFI AVENTIS DIAMIGO IPHONE APP, (2012), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm?id=114792 (announcing the
recall).
61. Cortez, supra note 43, at 1228.
62. Cf. Nayana Davis, The RX You Fill at the App Store, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://www.fastcompany.com/3034306/healthware/the-rx-you-fill-at-the-app-store (describing the
development of a prescription app and viewing how it is incorporated into professional practice).
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Johns Hopkins Medicine, “hear[s] pitches for several [apps] every week.” 63
Nevertheless, physicians and other health care providers have generally
been reluctant to incorporate mobile health apps and other types of mHealth
into their practices because of some of the same risks explained above. 64
However, as a younger, more tech-savvy generation of health care
professionals enters the field, new technologies such as mobile health apps
will begin to play a more prominent role.65 This increased reliance on
mobile health app technology worries some interest groups who ask, “what
happens when software ends up making very complex decisions and the
physicians, either because time does not permit or because the software
does not reveal enough to be evaluated, end up deferring to the software?”66
This very question led some stakeholders to ask for more, rather than less,
FDA oversight. 67
2. The FDA Suggests a Limited Regulatory Approach to Mobile
Medical Apps
Recognizing the challenge posed by mobile health apps, the FDA
attempted to clarify its position on these devices. 68 The FDA first released
the final Mobile Medical Application Guidance (“MMA Guidance”) in
2013, declaring that it would regulate a subset of mobile health apps that
posed the most risk to patients and users. 69 Additionally, the FDASIA

63. Id.
64. See Dayton, supra note 6, at 721; see also Ryan Faas, Why Your Doctor Doesn’t Want
You Using iPhone and iPad Health Apps, CULT OF MAC (June 20, 2012),
http://www.cultofmac.com/174776/why-your-doctor-doesnt-want-you-using-iphone-and-ipadhealth-apps/ (identifying physicians’ concerns that they would not be able to ensure that patients
properly use mobile health apps and that patients would soon avoid regular healthcare visits).
65. Katie Hafner, Redefining Medicine with Apps and iPads, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/science/redefining-medicine-with-apps-and-ipads-thedigital-doctor.html?pagewanted=all (“The proliferation of gadgets, apps and Web-based
information has given clinicians—especially young ones like Dr. Rajkomar, who is 28—a black
bag of new tools: new ways to diagnose symptoms and treat patients, to obtain and share
information, to think about what it means to be both a doctor and a patient.”).
66. See MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., EXAMPLES OF SOFTWARE THAT
WOULD BE DEREGULATED UNDER THE PROTECT ACT 3 (2014), available at
http://assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/newsletter/fiercehealthit/protectactexamplesV1.pdf
[hereinafter EXAMPLES].
67. See Letter from the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition to Sen. Tom Harkin,
Chairman of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (Feb. 14, 2014), available
at http://assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/newsletter/fiercehealthit/protectconsumer.pdf (opposing
proposed restrictions of FDA authority under the PROTECT Act of 2014).
68. See generally MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1 (non-binding guidance
document for agency and industry use).
69. See infra Part I.A.2.a.
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Health IT Report, released in early 2014, reiterated the agency’s view that
the FDA should limit its oversight to only a small portion of apps. 70
a. FDA Mobile Medical App Guidance
The FDA’s approach in the area of HIT and mobile health app
regulation has been characterized as informal, incremental, and restrained.71
By the time the FDA released the MMA Guidance in September 2013 72, the
agency was already regulating mobile-based software and had reviewed
over 100 mobile health apps. 73 The MMA Guidance declares that the FDA
will actively regulate only a limited category of apps that fit the FDCA’s
definition of a “device.” 74 The MMA Guidance also describes a risk-based
regulatory scheme that stresses what the FDA will not regulate. 75 For
example, the FDA will not regulate the sale of mobile platforms 76 such as
smartphones, and it will not apply any regulatory requirements to
companies that solely distribute apps, such as the iTunes App Store or
Google Play. 77 According to the MMA Guidance, the FDA will only
regulate “mobile medical app[s],” which are mobile apps that (1) act “as an
accessory to a regulated medical device” or (2) “transform a mobile
platform into a regulated medical device.” 78
Using these parameters, the MMA Guidance separates all mobile
health apps into three categories: (1) apps that do not meet the definition of
“device” and will not be regulated, (2) apps that may meet the definition of
“device” but pose such low risk that the FDA will exercise “enforcement
70. See FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 4 (claiming the “FDA would focus its
attention and oversight on medical device health IT functionality, such as computer aided
detection software, remote display or notification of real-time alarms from bedside monitors, and
robotic surgical planning and control”).
71. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
175, 190–91, 194 (2014) (arguing that the FDA’s use of “threats” to regulate software has been
counterproductive).
72. MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 1.
73. Statement of Christy L. Foreman, supra note 3, at 17. The FDA-approved MMAs
included “remote blood pressure, heart rhythm, and patient monitors, and smartphone-based
ultrasounds, EKG machines, and glucose monitors.” Id.
74. MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 4.
75. The MMA Guidance spends approximately twelve pages covering apps and
manufacturers that will not be regulated by the FDA. E.g., id. at 12–13, 20–25. See also
Statement of Jeffrey Shuren, supra note 27, at 14–15 (“Just as important as what the policy does is
what the policy does not do.”).
76. Mobile platforms are “commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computing platforms, with or
without wireless connectivity, that are handheld in nature,” including smartphones, tablet
computers, and portable computers. MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 7.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 4, 7. The FDA will provide “regulatory oversight to only those mobile apps that
are medical devices and whose functionality could pose a risk to a patient’s safety if the mobile
app were not function as intended. This subset of mobile apps the FDA refers to as mobile
medical apps.” Id. at 4.
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discretion” 79 over them, and (3) apps that will be regulated because they
meet the definition of “device” and may pose a higher risk to patients were
the app to malfunction.80 Using this scheme, the FDA has cleared over
forty MMAs 81 and taken one enforcement action related to MMAs since
2011. 82
The FDA declares it will not regulate simple educational or
administrative apps. 83 If an app is not intended to diagnose or treat a
patient, the FDA does not consider it to be a medical device. 84 Similarly,
the FDA will not enforce regulations against the “enforcement discretion”
category of low-risk apps, which includes apps that provide access to
electronic health records, communicate information to providers, or provide
tools to users to organize and track health information.85
Instead, the FDA will focus its oversight on the subset designated as
mobile medical apps. 86 This category includes mobile apps that connect to
medical devices in order to control the device, such as an app that controls a

79. Id. at 15. Enforcement discretion means the FDA “does not intend to enforce” the
regulatory requirements of the FDCA on this category of apps for now. Id.
80. Id. at 13.
81. CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
NARRATIVE
BY
ACTIVITY
86
(2014),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM3
94762.pdf. For example, the FDA cleared BlueStar, a prescription-only mobile app designed to
assist patients with Type-II diabetes to manage their disease. Davis, supra note 62.
82. In May 2013, the FDA sent an “It Has Come to Our Attention” Letter to Biosense
Technologies Ltd., developer of an app called uChek that allows users to take a picture of
urinalysis test strips with a smartphone and then identifies substances to deliver a result to the
patient. uChek had not been submitted to the FDA for clearance even though the FDA thought it
fit the definition of a medical device. Letter from James L. Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety
and Prod. Quality, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Myshkin Ingawale, Biosense Technologies
Private
Ltd.
(May
2013),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/ucm353513.htm;
see
also
Christian Farr, The FDA Launches First Inquiry into Medical iPhone App, VENTUREBEAT.COM
(May 29 2013), http://venturebeat.com/2013/05/29/the-fda-launches-first-inquiry-into-medicaliphone-app/ (discussing the FDA’s letter to Biosense). The FDA only addressed uChek’s nonconformance after the app was featured in a TED talk even though the app had been offered for
years without FDA clearance. This example highlights the FDA’s current inability to adequately
police the mammoth-sized world of mobile health apps. The company eventually recalled uChek
and retreated to foreign markets because it could not afford to go through the regulatory process.
FELLAY, supra note 5, at 6.
83. See id. at 20–22. Appendix A of the MMA Guidance provides examples of apps that will
not be regulated by the FDA, such as apps that provide electronic copies of medical reference
books or automate office functions. Id.
84. Id. at 20.
85. Id. at 15–18, 23–25. Under these guidelines, daily exercise and calorie trackers apps may
technically be medical devices, but will nevertheless not be regulated. Id. at 24–25. Appendix B
of the MMA Guidance provides examples of apps that fall under the enforcement discretion
category. Id. at 23–26.
86. Id. at 13.
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blood pressure cuff. 87 The FDA considers this sort of app to be an
accessory that falls under the same regulations as the parent device.88 The
MMA may also be an app that transforms a mobile platform, like a
smartphone or tablet, into a medical device using sensors, display screens,
or attachments. 89 The MMA Guidance gives examples of apps that use
attachments of a glucose strip reader to transform a mobile platform into a
glucose meter or apps that use a smartphone’s built-in accelerometer to
measure movement to monitor sleep apnea.90 Lastly, any mobile app that
analyzes or diagnoses patients using patient-specific data will fall under
FDA oversight. 91 For instance, an app that uses radiation therapy treatment
software to calculate dosages of radiation for a particular patient would be
considered a mobile medical app. 92 Apps that fall into the MMA category
will be classified under the three-class system just as any other medical
device according to the risk they present. 93
In general, the FDA places all regulated medical devices into three
classes according to the level of risk presented by the intended use of the
device. 94 A mobile app will be regulated under this medical device class
system only “[w]hen the intended use of a mobile app is for the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease, or is intended to affect the structure or any function of the body
of man.” 95 Class I devices are those that pose no “potential unreasonable
risk of illness or injury.” 96 Class II devices pose more risk of injury to
patients and must be under general and “special controls,” including postmarket surveillance. 97 Lastly, Class III devices are “represented to be for a
use in supporting or sustaining human life” or present “a potential
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 14–15.
90. Id. at 15.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 13. Appendix C provides examples of apps that are considered mobile medical
apps and will be regulated by the FDA. Id. at 27–29.
94. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012).
95. MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added). Intended use is
the “objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of devices. . . . shown by
labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or their
representatives.” MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 8 n.5 (citing 21 C.F.R. §
801.4 (2014)). A mobile medical app manufacturer is “anyone who initiates specifications,
designs, labels, or creates a software system or application for a regulated medical device in whole
or from multiple software components.” MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 9.
For example, an app that makes an LED operate may or may not fall under regulation as a device.
If the app is intended to be a general light source, it will not be regulated. However, if the app is
labeled and marketed to be used by doctors as a light source to examine patients, similar to an
ophthalmoscope, then it will fall under the FDA’s oversight. Id. at 8.
96. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
97. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
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unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” 98 Most manufacturers attempt to
avoid Class III classification and pre-market approval because it is often a
long, expensive process requiring substantial amounts of testing and clinical
trials. 99
To summarize, if a mobile health app does not fall under the definition
of a “mobile medical app” it will not be regulated by the FDA. 100
Furthermore, some mobile health apps will fall under the “enforcement
discretion” category and not be regulated either. 101 Finally, even the mobile
health apps that do fall under the riskier, regulated “mobile medical app”
category will be classified under the general Class I–III system that applies
to all medical devices, meaning they may only be subject to minimal
controls. 102
b. FDASIA Health IT Report
The much-anticipated FDASIA Health IT Report, released in April
2014, provided further insight into how federal agencies are approaching
mobile health apps and HIT in general.103 Section 618 of the Food and
Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (“FDASIA”) 104
commissioned the FDA to write the Report in conjunction with the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) and the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (“ONC”). 105 Congress

98. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
99. See FELLAY, supra note 5, at 9–10. In fact, any type of FDA approval process is often a
hindrance to device manufacturers. The first sponsor to submit a new device, especially, is at a
disadvantage because the new device must go through more initial testing to enter the market,
whereas future similar devices only have to prove “substantial equivalence” to the first device to
receive FDA approval. Id.
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id. at 15–16.
102. Id. at 13. All MMA manufacturers must meet the generally applicable device regulatory
requirements such as registering and listing the MMAs they market with the FDA. Id. at 33.
MMA manufacturers must also comply with Quality System regulations, which mandate the
development of safety requirements, procedures to design, produce, and distribute MMAs, and
verification processes for the MMAs on various mobile platforms. Id. at 34. For more
information on Quality System regulations, see Quality System Requirements, Management
Responsibility, 21 C.F.R. § 820.20 (2014).
103. See FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 3 (recommending a four-pronged
approach of fostering safety, leveraging standards, using industry-led testing and certification, and
creating a learning environment for HIT).
104. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–144,
126 Stat. 993 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). FDASIA amended the
FDCA. Id. § 2(b).
105. Id. § 618. The ONC, an office within the Department for Health and Human Services,
was first created by executive order in 2004 and later established by the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act in 2009. The ONC oversees the
development of standards and certification criteria for HIT and supports two federal advisory
committees. FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 6.
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instructed these agencies to address “an appropriate, risk-based regulatory
framework pertaining to HIT, including mobile medical applications, that
promotes innovation, protects patient safety, and avoids regulatory
duplication.” 106 Under the direction of the statute, the agencies formed a
FDASIA Workgroup consisting of a representative of each of the three
agencies involved, plus twenty-eight individuals from the general public. 107
Overall, the Report continued the theme of deemphasizing the FDA’s
role in HIT regulation. 108 Again, the Report stressed that no “new or
additional mandatory conformity assessments” should be required before a
new HIT device is allowed to be marketed or used.109 The Report
concluded that “a limited, narrowly-tailored approach that primarily relies
on ONC-coordinated activities and private sector capabilities is prudent,”
implying these options were preferred over FDA oversight.110 Other
methods, such as industry-led certification and development of best
practices, were emphasized, rather than a regulation-first approach. 111 The
Report’s authors also envisioned more cooperation with stakeholders and
the private sector. 112 For example, the Report suggests that nongovernmental entities may manage the testing, inspection, and certification
of mobile health app manufacturers to insure they meet certain minimum
standards. 113
The authors of the FDASIA Health IT Report also recommended the
creation of a Health IT Safety Center, a public-private entity formed by the
ONC, FDA, FCC, and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality with
input from other agencies and IT stakeholders.114 The Center is meant to
involve stakeholders in gathering the scientific evidence and data necessary
to create HIT safety goals and educate the HIT community on best practices
and patient safety. 115 Beyond mentioning that the Center would require “a
106. FDASIA § 618(a) (emphasis added).
107. FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 7. The public members included “experts
representing patients, consumers, health care providers, startup companies, health plans, venture
capitalists, IT and health IT vendors, small businesses, purchasers, and employers.” Id.
108. Id. at 3 (“[N]o new or additional areas of FDA oversight are needed.”).
109. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Rather, the assessment tools will simply distinguish between
the products and organizations that create high quality products meeting the minimum standards
and those that do not. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. (“[A] better approach is to foster the development of a culture of safety and
equality; leverage standards and best practices; employ industry-led testing and certification; and
selectively use tools such as voluntary listing, reporting, and training to enable the development of
a healthcare environment that is transparent and promotes learning to foster continual health IT
improvement.”).
112. See id. at 29 (“[T]he Agencies intend to continue active engagement with stakeholders in
an ongoing collaborative effort to implement a health IT framework . . . .”).
113. Id. at 21.
114. Id. at 14–15.
115. Id.
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strong governance mechanism,” the Report did not specify how this entity
would be formed, what its authority would be, if any, and how it would
operate. 116 Ultimately, the FDASIA Report demonstrated that there is no
consensus on who should be making the guidelines or standards for
regulation of mobile health apps—the FDA, non-governmental entities, or
perhaps both—and that more information on mHealth is needed.117
After the release of the FDASIA Health IT Report, the FDA began
adjusting its regulation of HIT. In June 2014, the FDA issued another
guidance document (“MDDS Guidance”), which it finalized in February
2015, 118 declaring it would not enforce its prior regulations of medical
device data systems (“MDDS”), 119 medical image storage devices, and
medical image communication devices. 120 The MDDS Guidance stated
“the FDA has gained additional experience with these types of
technologies, and has determined that these devices pose a low risk to the
public.” 121 The MDDS Guidance also affected the MMA Guidance since
the latter originally contemplated the regulation of apps that served MDDS
functions. 122
Even after the FDA explained its regulatory intentions through the
MMA Guidance, the FDASIA Report, and public workshops, 123

116. Id.
117. See id. at 22 (questioning the role of the government and non-governmental entities in
making decisions about possible assessment tools for HIT); accord Transcript of Panel B at 148–
49, Public Workshop—Proposed Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information
Technology
(May
13,
2014),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (discussing the possible role of stakeholders versus the federal agencies to write
accountability rules for HIT).
118. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF: MEDICAL DEVICE DATA SYSTEMS, MEDICAL IMAGE STORAGE
DEVICES, AND MEDICAL IMAGE COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES (2015), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/UCM401996.pdf [hereinafter MDDS GUIDANCE].
119. Medical Device Data Systems are “hardware or software products that transfer, store,
convert formats, and display medical device data. . . . MDDS are not intended to be used in
connection with active patient monitoring.” Id. at 5.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id. The MDDS Guidance affected the 2011 Medical Device Data Systems Final Rule
that lowered MDDS from Class III to Class I. Medical Device Data System Rule, 21
C.F.R. § 880.6310 (2014).
122. The MMA Guidance was updated and reissued on February 9, 2015, to reflect the
changes relating to MDDS. MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 1.
123. The FDA hosted public workshops in 2011 and 2014 to discuss the FDA’s proposed
regulatory framework for HIT and MMAs. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC
WORKSHOP—MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS DRAFT GUIDANCE (2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/ucm267821.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC WORKSHOP—PROPOSED RISKBASED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGY FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
(2014),
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stakeholders still believe the mobile health app regulatory landscape is
unstable. 124 Multiple healthcare and technology organizations wrote a letter
to Congress in October 2014 calling for increased “statutory clarity and a
stable foundation” for the continued growth of HIT innovation in contrast to
the “[c]urrent regulatory uncertainty [that] stifles health care innovation.” 125
In fact, Congress had already been considering different measures that
would affect the regulation of mobile health apps.126
3. Congress and Stakeholders React to FDA Regulation of Mobile
Health Apps
As the FDA works to solidify MMA regulation, stakeholders and
Congress are unsure how much authority the FDA should have in that area.
While the FDA was still receiving stakeholder comments on the proposed
MMA Guidance in 2012, some members of Congress attempted to slow
down the regulatory process out of fear that regulation would halt
innovation and expansion. 127
Many stakeholders encouraged these
128
congressional slow-down efforts.
Individuals within the HIT industry
“believe[d] that any new set of regulations, no matter how well-intentioned
in development, [would] likely have unintended consequences or lead to a
regulatory land grab.” 129 Not all stakeholders, however, supported these
efforts to stall the MMA Guidance.130 For example, the mHealth
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/ucm392877.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015).
124. See, e.g., Letter from Access Integrity, supra note 30, at 1 (informing Congress that
uncertainties in the HIT market are creating barriers to innovation).
125. Id. at 1–2.
126. See infra Part I.A.3.
127. See Brian Dolan, How Congress Almost Delayed the FDA’s Mobile Medical App
Guidance, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (July 5, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/17707/how-congressalmost-delayed-the-fdas-mobile-app-guidance/.
Senator Michael Bennet (D) proposed an
amendment that would impose a “year-long moratorium on [the MMA Guidance] so that HHS
and an outside working group of various stakeholders can work together on a report to Congress
to help us do the proper due diligence on this issue.” Id. But see Health Information
Technologies: Harnessing Wireless Innovation: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commc’n
and Techn. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Rep.
Doris O. Matsui) (stating that the FDA MMA Guidance should be finalized quickly in order to
provide clarity and boost investor confidence).
128. See Dolan, supra note 127 (interviewing Joel White, Executive Director of the Health IT
Now Coalition, which represents large corporations such as Verizon and Aetna, who supported the
Bennet-Hatch Amendment’s requirement to seek stakeholder advice, asserting “external input is
critical”).
129. Id. One industry representative made the following comment: “Does the FDA really
have any teeth? Do we really need a finalized guidance document? Look at how quickly mobile
health has grown in the past year, the past two years.” Id.
130. See Letter from Bradley Merrill Thompson, mHealth Regulatory Coalition, on BennetHatch Amendment to Senator Tom Harkin, Chairman, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and
Pensions, and Senator Michael B. Enzi, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions 1–2 (May
17, 2012), available at http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/MRC-
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Regulatory Commission (“MRC”) 131 believed a finalized MMA Guidance
would actually benefit the HIT industry because it would decrease the
uncertainty that halted further innovation.132 Ultimately, the resulting
legislation, FDASIA, did not stall the FDA’s issuance of the MMA
Guidance. 133
Still, Congress continued to attempt to craft a statutory barrier to
diminish FDA regulation of mobile health apps. The release of the final
MMA Guidance was preceded by a bill proposed in the House of
Representatives, the SOFTWARE Act of 2013, 134 and followed by a similar
bill in the Senate, the PROTECT Act of 2014. 135 Both bills concerned the
FDA’s authority to regulate mobile health apps.
Bradley Merrill
Thompson, counsel for the MRC and part of the FDASIA workgroup,
surmised that Congress was trying to frustrate the efforts of the FDA with
these bills, particularly because the PROTECT Act was introduced so soon
after the MMA Guidance and shortly before the release of the expected
FDASIA Health IT Report. 136 Then, on December 4, 2014, Senators Orrin

Letter-to-Senate-HELP-Committee-on-Proposed-Moratorium-FINAL.pdf
(opposing
the
amendment that would stall FDA action, claiming that the amendment would stall job creation and
innovation in the HIT sector because of regulatory confusion).
131. The MRC represents mHealth stakeholders including medical device manufacturers, app
developers, telecommunications providers, and non-profit health associations, such as AT&T,
Verizon Wireless, Continua Health Alliance, Voxiva, MedApps, and many more. Id. at 2. About
Us, MHEALTH REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/about-us/ (last
visited Jan. 4, 2015).
132. See Letter from Bradley Merrill Thompson, mHealth Regulatory Coalition, on FDA
Guidance to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Dept. of Health and Human Services (June 21, 2013),
available at http://mobihealthnews.com/wp-content/pdf/MRCforFDAfinalguidance.pdf (“writing
on behalf of the mHealth Regulatory Coalition (“MRC”) to encourage HHS, through FDA, to
publish the final guidance on mobile medical apps as soon as reasonably possible”).
133. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–144,
§ 618(a), 126 Stat. 993 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Instead FDASIA
required the FDA, ONC, and FCC to work with external stakeholders to create and publish a
report advising how to regulate health IT so that the government could keep tabs on the agency’s
regulatory efforts. See supra Part I.A.2.b. See also Dolan, supra note 127 (discussing the result
of Senator Bennet’s proposed moratorium).
134. Sensible Oversight for Technology which Advances Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013,
H.R. 3303, 113th Cong. (2013). See Christina Farr, Congress Wants to Kick the FDA out of
(Feb.
26,
2014),
Digital
Health
with
This
New
Bill,
VENTUREBEAT,
http://venturebeat.com/2014/02/26/new-digital-health-bill-proposes-to-undermine-the-fda-drawsmixed-reactions/. Representative Blackburn stated that she plans to reintroduce an updated
version of the SOFTWARE Act in 2015. Dan Bowman, Orrin Hatch: MEDTECH Act Vital to
(Dec.
5,
2014),
Protecting
Healthcare
Innovation,
FIERCEHEALTHIT
http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/orrin-hatch-medtech-act-vital-protecting-healthcareinnovation/2014-12-05.
135. Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007,
113th Cong. (2014) (introduced Feb. 10, 2014).
136. Farr, supra note 134. Thompson stated, “[t]he September guidance was greeted with
relief and fanfare. . . . Most people who read [the Guidance] said it’s a sensible approach, [so] why
are we legislating to undo that?” Id.
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Hatch (R) and Michael Bennet (D) introduced another bill concerning the
regulation of mobile health apps, the MEDTECH Act of 2014.137
All three bills seek to amend the FDCA, the FDA’s source of authority
to regulate medical devices, by placing certain types of medical software
out of the FDA’s regulatory reach. 138 The SOFTWARE Act proposed to
limit the FDA’s jurisdiction to “medical software,” excluding “clinical” or
“health software.” 139 If enacted, the SOFTWARE Act would limit the
FDA’s enforcement discretion and prevent it from regulating software
products marketed to health care professionals.140
Similarly, the
MEDTECH Act excludes certain types of low-risk software and mobile
health apps from FDA regulation. 141
Under the PROTECT Act, at least some MMAs, such as those with
clinical decision support (“CDS”) software, would not fall under the FDA’s
jurisdiction. 142 Examples of CDS apps include sports concussion apps,
melanoma detection apps, and drug dose calculator apps that are marketed

137. Medical Electronic Data Technology Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act, S. 2977,
113th Cong. (2014).
138. See S. 2007 § 3(b) (giving the following prohibition: “Clinical software and health
software shall not be subject to regulation under [the FDCA]”); H.R. 3303 § 4 (amending Section
201 of the FDCA to exclude health and clinical software); S. 2977 § 2 (defining “device” under
the FDCA to exclude administrative software, software used for health and conditioning outside
of a clinical setting, electronic patient records, and more).
139. H.R. 3303 § 2. Medical software is partially defined as:
software . . . intended to be marketed for use by consumers and makes
recommendations for clinical action that—(i) includes the use of a drug, device, or
procedure to cure or treat a disease or other condition without requiring the involvement
of a health care provider; and (ii) if followed, would change the structure or any
function of the body of man or other animals; (2) [but] is not software whose primary
purpose is integral to the functioning of a drug or device; and (3) is not a component of
a device.
Id.
140. See id. § 3(a). Clinical software, which is removed from the FDA’s jurisdiction under the
SOFTWARE Act, is defined as:
clinical decision support software . . . intended for human or animal use that—(A)
captures, analyzes, changes, or presents patient or population clinical data or
information and may recommend courses of clinical action, but does not directly
change the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (B) is
intended to be marketed for use only by a health care provider in a health care setting.
Id.
141. S. 2977 § 2. Specifically, Sen. Hatch, the MEDTECH Act’s author, said, “the bill limits
and clarifies the FDA’s role regarding regulation of administrative and financial software,
wellness and lifestyle products, certain aspects of electronic health records and software that aids
healthcare providers in developing treatment recommendations for their patients.” Bowman,
supra note 134.
142. See MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66, at 1–3 (listing
different software and mobile medical apps that are presently regulated by the FDA but would not
be under the PROTECT Act of 2014).
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to consumers to use without involving medical professionals.143 These apps
pose unique risks to patients, especially when used in an emergency setting,
leading some HIT stakeholders to object to the bill’s deregulation of CDS
software. 144
So why is Congress considering overriding the FDA’s current MMA
framework? First, some elected officials argue that the FDA’s old
regulatory methods and statutory mandate are incompatible with new
technological advances. 145 Specifically, the authors of the PROTECT Act
wrote that the FDCA definition of medical device is “overly broad,”
“dated,” and “bad news for health IT innovation.” 146 The PROTECT Act
discusses the importance of HIT innovation and the economic impact of
mobile health: mobile health apps have created over 500,000 new jobs in
the United States, and it is projected that the market will reach $26 billion
by 2017. 147 Proponents of the Act think Congress must “intervene” in order
to focus “agency efforts on fostering health information technology and
mobile health innovation while better protecting patient safety, improving
health care, and creating jobs in the United States.” 148 The PROTECT Act
names specific agencies, such as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, the ONC, and the FCC, to “work on next steps . . . such as
collaborating with nongovernmental entities to develop certification
processes and to promote best practice standards.” 149 Noticeably absent
from this list of regulators is the FDA. 150
Not everyone, however, supports these congressional efforts.
Specifically, the MRC, CDS Coalition, and the Patient, Consumer, and
Public Health Coalition, oppose the PROTECT Act.151 The latter, a patient
143. Id. at 1–2. Melanoma detection apps are a particularly worrisome category of apps since
one study found that three out of four melanoma apps incorrectly classified thirty percent of
melanomas as “unconcerning,” which could potentially leave a dangerous skin condition
undiscovered and untreated. Joel A. Wolf et al., Diagnostic Inaccuracy of Smartphone
Applications for Melanoma Detection, 149 JAMA DERMATOLOGY 422, 422 (2013).
144. See MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66, at 3 (giving the
example of Emergency Care Predictive Analytics Software, which processes large amounts of
healthcare and vital sign data to make a recommendation in an emergency care setting and
claiming that because “the volume of information that the software considers and the little time
available to the doctor or EMT, there is no practical way for the physician or EMT to read,
understand and critically evaluate the basis for the computer’s recommendation”).
145. See, e.g., Fischer & King, supra note 10 (“The FDA’s regulatory footprint is growing
beyond its statutory shoe size.”).
146. Id.
147. S. 2007 § 2(a).
148. Id. § 2(b).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66, at 1–3 (posing the
risks presented by the PROTECT Act’s removal of certain software from FDA jurisdiction);
Letter from the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition to Sen. Harkin, supra note 67
(claiming that millions of Americans may be put at risk if software-reliant devices like MRIs were
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advocacy group, wrote to Senator Tom Harkin, the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, that “[w]e are
extremely concerned that this bill will deregulate a broad swath of medical
devices that rely on software and will create opportunities for rampant
‘gaming’ to avoid regulation.” 152 The group thinks that FDA intervention is
necessary to protect consumers:
Without [the] FDA to carefully scrutinize the risks and benefits of
a device, patients’ health may be seriously harmed. Even if the
device itself is not harmful, if it is not proven effective, then
patients could be harmed by inaccurate results that are either
anxiety-producing or erroneously reassuring; these outcomes
could result either in unnecessary testing or serious illness or
death. 153
Yet opponents of the PROTECT Act reacted more positively to the
more recent MEDTECH Act because it preserved FDA authority over
medium-risk and high-risk apps. 154 Currently, the bills are still in
committee. 155
B. FDA Regulation of Dietary Supplements and the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act
Congress’s concerns and the FDA’s current unstable position in the
mobile health context are reminiscent of an earlier debate over the
regulation of dietary supplements in the 1990s. In 1993, the FDA proposed
more stringent regulation of certain dietary supplements after they were
no longer regulated by the FDA under the PROTECT Act’s restrictions); see also Greg Slabodkin,
Industry Group Voices ‘Extreme’ Concern with PROTECT Act, FIERCEMOBILEHEALTHCARE
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.fiercemobilehealthcare.com/story/industry-group-voices-extremeconcern-protect-act/2014-02-19 (summarizing the groups’ opposition to the PROTECT Act).
152. Letter from the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition to Sen. Harkin, supra
note 67.
153. Id.
154. See Christina Farr, Draft U.S. Legislation Would Curb FDA Medical Software Oversight,
REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/25/fda-technologyidUSL2N0TE22020141125. Bradley Thompson called the MEDTECH Act “a straightforward
and clean approach” that “is less likely to have unintended consequences.” Id.
155. The SOFTWARE Act died in the House Committee on Energy and Commerce: Health,
but it will likely be reintroduced in 2015. H.R. 3303 (113th): Sensible Oversight for Technology
which
Advances
Regulatory
Efficiency
Act
of
2013,
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3303 (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). The PROTECT
Act of 2014 also remains unenacted after being referred to the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions. S. 2007 (113th): Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance
Care Technology Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2007
(last visited Feb. 5, 2015). The MEDTECH Act was also referred to the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. S. 2977 (113th): Medical Electronic Data Technology
Enhancement
for
Consumers’
Health
Act,
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2977 (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). Sen. Hatch plans to
reintroduce the bill in 2015. Bowman, supra note 134.

2015]

MOBILE HEALTH APPS

941

linked to serious injury and death.156 The FDA’s proposal was followed by
industry pushback 157 and a swift congressional response—the passage of
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994.158 DSHEA
completely changed the way dietary supplements were regulated and
hampered the FDA’s ability to protect the public from dangerous and
ineffective dietary supplements.159
1. The FDA Regulated Dietary Supplements Before DSHEA
The FDA has regulated dietary supplements since 1938. 160 Dietary
supplements include vitamins, minerals, herbal remedies, and amino
acids 161 and can be in gel, capsule, drink, powder, or even energy bar
form. 162 Historically, the FDA classified each dietary supplement either as
a drug, food additive, or food product based on the claims for intended use
made by the manufacturer on the labeling. 163 If a label made a “drug” claim
or fell into the food additive category, the FDA required stricter controls
such as pre-market approval of the supplement, which meant the
manufacturer had to substantiate its claims by “adequate and wellcontrolled investigations.” 164
Otherwise, supplements making mere
nutrition claims could be regulated as foods, which were presumed to be
safe. 165
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the extent of regulation over dietary
supplements fluctuated as the FDA created new regulatory classification
schemes which were later abandoned due to industry pressure,
156. See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,690 (citing the thousands of
injuries caused by L-tryptophan as motivation to reassess dietary supplement regulation).
157. See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 93 (describing the dietary supplement industry’s reaction
to the FDA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and how industry efforts led to the passage of
DSHEA); see also infra Part I.B.2.
158. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat.
4325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
159. See infra Part I.B.3.
160. For a brief historical overview of the legislative and regulatory history of dietary
supplements, see COMM’N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON
DIETARY
SUPPLEMENT
LABELS
11–13
(1997),
available
at
http://www.health.gov/dietsupp/final.pdf.
161. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1). Dietary supplements are defined as “dietary substance[s]
[used] by man to supplement the diet by increasing the total dietary intake.” Id.
162. OFFICE OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS:
WHAT
YOU
NEED
TO
KNOW
1
(2011),
available
at
http://ods.od.nih.gov/HealthInformation/DS_WhatYouNeedToKnow.aspx.
163. Jennifer Akre Hill, Comment, Creating Balance: Problems Within DSHEA and
Suggestions for Reform, 2 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 361, 366–67 (2006).
164. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994). See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 89–95 (summarizing the
pre-DSHEA regulatory framework for dietary supplements). Food additives were required to
show that the ingredient was “generally recognized as safe” in order to receive pre-market
approval by the FDA. Hill, supra note 163, at 367–68.
165. Hill, supra note 163, at 367–68.
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congressional interference, judicial decrees, or all three. 166 Following the
backlash, the FDA exercised “regulatory restraint” in the 1980s and early
1990s, which led to an increase in the number of dietary supplements on the
market. 167 In the 1990s, however, when 38 deaths and 1500 other adverse
events were traced to the uses of L-tryptophan, a non-essential amino acid
used in supplements, the FDA initiated an investigation into new ways to
handle the safety issues associated with dietary supplements. 168 The FDA
released an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that sought stronger
regulatory features, such as pre-market review for a range of supplements,
to combat the safety risks posed by many supplement ingredients.169
2. Industry Anger and Congressional Pushback: The Enactment of
DSHEA
The supplement industry saw the FDA’s recommendations as an
attempt to drastically reduce the sale and marketing of dietary supplements,
and the industry started a campaign to ensure that the FDA would not
succeed. 170 For example, retailers held a “Blackout Day” in which they
covered in black crepe all of the supplements which could potentially be
taken off the market under a broad FDA regulatory scheme. 171 Responding
to the industry’s concern, members of Congress introduced DSHEA, and

166. See id. at 368–70 (giving the history of the FDA’s regulation of dietary supplements
during the 1960s and 1970s). For example, when the FDA began regulating high dosages and
“irrational combinations” of supplements previously treated as “foods,” lobbyists convinced
Congress to pass the Proxmire Amendment. Id. at 369. The Amendment restricted the FDA’s
authority to regulate supplements based on potency or combination, Pub. L. No. 94-278, § 501, 90
Stat. 410 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350 (1976)). The Amendment was followed by a
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit holding that the FDA could not limit
potency of supplements under its current authority. Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Matthews,
557 F.2d 325, 336 (2d Cir. 1977).
167. Hill, supra note 163, at 370; see also Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at
33,690 (discussing the growth and change in the dietary supplement industry in the early 1990s).
168. See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 92; see also Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed.
Reg. at 33,690–91 (explaining that the Dietary Supplement Task Force was created to investigate
the safety of supplements).
169. See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,697 (suggesting treating
dietary supplements containing amino acids as drugs or food additives, which require additional
FDA oversight); see also COMM’N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, supra note 160, at 13
(summarizing the FDA’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking).
170. See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 93 (discussing the dietary supplement industry’s reaction
to the FDA’s investigation and proposals); see also COMM’N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS,
supra note 160, at 13 (calling the FDA’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking a “significant
motivating factor” in the efforts to secure the enactment of DSHEA).
171. The Tan Sheet, Dietary Supplement Blackout Day to Support Hatch/Richardson Bills,
&
MEDTECH
BUS.
INTELLIGENCE
(Aug.
9,
1993),
PHARMA
https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/publications/the-tan-sheet/01/024/dietary-supplementblackout-day-to-support-hatchrichardson-bills. The Blackout Day campaign’s slogan was “Don’t
Let Health Freedom Follow the Dinosaur.” Id.
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represented the bill as protection for patient autonomy and consumer
choice. 172
The lobbying efforts paid off. Passed unanimously by Congress 173 and
signed into law by President Clinton, DSHEA classified dietary
supplements as food rather than drugs or food additives under the FDCA 174
and established a special regulatory framework for dietary supplements that
limited the FDA’s ability to regulate them. 175 Congress enacted DSHEA
for a number of reasons, but namely because it thought the FDA had
erected “unreasonable regulatory barriers”176 that could prevent consumers
from receiving dietary supplements—products that were widely used,
generally safe, and available at a lower cost than traditional medicines.177
DSHEA was meant to rectify the FDA’s inadequate, “ad hoc, patchwork
regulatory policy” 178 and “bring common sense to the treatment of dietary
supplements under regulation and law.”179 With the enactment of DSHEA,
Congress ultimately foreclosed much of the FDA’s power in dietary
supplement regulation.180
3. DSHEA’s Negative Impact on Dietary Supplement Regulation
and Public Health and Safety
DSHEA drastically changed the regulation of dietary supplements and
has since been labeled “the most important example of deregulation of a
federal health and safety program.” 181 Dietary supplements are now treated
as a category of food, and thus do not undergo agency scrutiny before they
are marketed directly to the consumer. 182 Only “new dietary ingredients,”
172. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2,
108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (“[C]onsumers should be
empowered to make choices about preventive health care programs based on data from scientific
studies of health benefits related to particular dietary supplements.”).
173. Hill, supra note 163, at 371.
174. See DSHEA § 3 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)) (“[A] dietary supplement shall be
deemed to be a food within the meaning of this [Act].”).
175. See DSHEA § 4 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 342) (adding new standards for determining
whether a supplement is adulterated and placing the burden of proof on the FDA to show that a
supplement is adulterated).
176. DSHEA § 2 (legislative findings).
177. Id. At that time, almost fifty percent of Americans regularly used dietary supplements
for nutrition purposes. Id.
178. Id.
179. William J. Clinton, President, Statement upon Signing S. 784 (Oct. 25, 1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 3523-1.
180. See Hill, supra note 163, at 363 (charging DSHEA with failing to provide the FDA with
adequate regulatory power to protect consumers).
181. Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 85.
182. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2012) (defining dietary supplements as “food” within the
meaning of the statute); see also David Kessler, Cancer and Herbs, 342 N. ENG. J. MED. 1742,
1742–43 (2000) (discussing how supplements are regulated under the DSHEA).
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dietary supplement ingredients not marketed prior to October 15, 1994,
need FDA approval—all other ingredients were grandfathered in by
DSHEA. 183 Supplements sold before 1994 may only be regulated if the
FDA can prove that they are adulterated and present an “unreasonable risk
of illness or injury.” 184 If the FDA desires to remove a product from the
market, it must prove that the product is an “imminent hazard to public
health or safety,” a process that requires the FDA to use its limited
resources to conduct testing and studies on a supplement.185
Since its enactment DSHEA has faced criticism from academics and
medical professionals who claim that the Act’s regulatory framework leaves
the public vulnerable to dangerous dietary supplements.186 Many scholars
call for DSHEA’s repeal or amendment because it placed the FDA in a
reactive role, led to an increase of drug-like products posing as dietary
supplements, and made it difficult for the FDA to remove dangerous
supplements from the market. 187
Much of the criticism is directed at the fact that the FDA now has a
purely reactive role and can only act after it has found proof that substantial

183. 21 U.S.C. § 350b(d) (2012).
184. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (2012).
185. Id.; see also Richard Potomac, Are You Sure You Want to Eat That?: U.S. Government
and Private Regulation of Domestically Produced and Marketed Dietary Supplements, 23 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 54, 66 (2010) (noting that initiating a ban of a dietary supplement is
impractical for the FDA because it is “incredibly onerous, expensive, and time-consuming”); Hill,
supra note 163, at 381–84 (describing the FDA’s long, arduous effort to ban ephedra from the
dietary supplement market).
186. See, e.g., Interview by Ira Flatow, NPR, with Paul Offit, Chief of the Division of
Infectious Diseases, Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia (July 5, 2013), available at
http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/199025493/is-alternative-medicine-really-medicine (“[DSHEA] is
an education act that has nothing to do with education and everything to do with the consumer not
knowing what they’re buying because the industry is now allowed to, frankly, sell products under
this wink and nod . . . .”); Letter from Michael D. Maves, Am. Medical Ass’n, to Sen. Richard J.
Durbin (Feb. 17, 2004), reprinted in 10 Years After the Implementation of DSHEA: The Status of
Dietary Supplements in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and
Wellness of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 30 (2004) (stating that the American
Medical Association believes that DSHEA fails to give the FDA “adequate regulatory oversight”
of dietary supplements and supports amendments to the statute).
187. See, e.g., Peter J. Cohen, Science, Politics, and the Regulation of Dietary Supplements:
It’s Time to Repeal DSHEA, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 181 (2005) (“DSHEA gutted much of what
had been accepted as integral to the states’ protection of consumers.”); Potomac, supra note 185,
at 55 (claiming the current dietary supplement regulatory framework puts the public in
“substantial risk”); Hill, supra note 163, at 364 (joining other academics in arguing that DSHEA
needs to be amended in order to protect consumers). But see Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, A
Drug by Any Other Name . . . ?: Paradoxes in Dietary Supplement Risk Regulation, 17 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 165, 167–68 (2006) (arguing that DSHEA grants the FDA adequate “regulatory
muscle” to implement “aggressive” risk-management and needs not be repealed); Joshua H.
Beisler, Note, Dietary Supplements and Their Discontents: FDA Regulation and the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 511, 512–13 (2000) (arguing that
DSHEA plays an important role in maintaining consumer access to dietary supplements).
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harm has occurred. 188 David Kessler, former FDA Commissioner, agrees
that DSHEA is inadequate:
The safety standard may sound as if the FDA has all the
authority it needs to protect the public. The problem is that the
burden of proof lies with the FDA. Even when the agency is able
to act, how is it supposed to know which products contain
[harmful substances], and who sells them? 189
After the passage of DSHEA, the number of available dietary
supplements increased dramatically, from 4000 to 55,000 in 2012, making
it even more difficult for the FDA to keep tabs on the changing industry. 190
Exempt from providing the initial information required of their
pharmaceutical counterparts, dietary supplement manufacturers and their
products are relatively unknown entities until an adverse event or other red
flag garners FDA attention. 191 For example, before it was voluntarily
recalled in 2009, the weight-loss supplement Hydroxycut was linked to one
death and twenty-three instances of liver failure.192 Neither the FDA nor
the millions of consumers who used Hydroxycut had any way to determine
the safety of the product beforehand because DSHEA so limited the FDA’s
role in overseeing dietary supplements. 193 Without a reliable source
ensuring a product’s integrity, consumers cannot be sure dietary

188. See, e.g., Richard E. Nowak, DSHEA’s Failure: Why a Proactive Approach to Dietary
Supplement Regulation Is Needed to Effectively Protect Consumers, Comment, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1045, 1068, 1076 (2010) (critiquing the FDA’s “limited, reactive authority” to regulate
dietary supplements under DSHEA and recommending a proactive approach modeled after the
European Union’s Food Supplement Directive).
189. Kessler, supra note 182, at 1743; see also Potomac, supra note 185, at 65 (echoing the
claim that the FDA lacks knowledge about what supplements are being produced, which is a
major barrier to effective regulation under DSHEA).
190. Pieter A. Cohen, Assessing Supplement Safety—The FDA’s Controversial Proposal, 366
N. ENG. J. MED. 389, 389 (2012); see also Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act: Is the
FDA Trying to Change the Intent of Congress?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform,
106th Cong. 17 (1999) (statement of Jane Henney, Comm’r., FDA), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/gro/hgo57333.000/hgo57333_0f.htm (commenting on the
significant changes in the dietary supplement industry since the passage of the DSHEA).
191. See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 118 (stating that the “important problem with
supplements is the unknown”).
192. Nowak, supra note 188, at 1048.
193. Id. A more recent example of an unsafe ingredient being marketed as a “natural” dietary
supplement is DMAA (also known as dimethylamylamine, methylhexanamine or geranium
extract). Consumer Updates: Stimulant Potentially Dangerous to Consumers, FDA Warns, U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Apr.
11,
2013),
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm347270.htm. The ingredient is illegal
to include in dietary supplements and has been linked to causing heart attacks and death. Id. In an
effort to get DMAA out of the marketplace, the FDA issued warning letters to manufacturers
whose products contained DMAA. Id.
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supplements are what they claim to be, and the FDA is unable to act until a
serious problem occurs. 194
DSHEA also incentivized manufacturers to market their products as
dietary supplements in order to take advantage of the Act’s relaxed
restrictions. 195 Manufacturers of products that previously were not
considered food supplements can now take advantage of DSHEA’s broad
definition of dietary supplement and make claims about the structure of the
body as long as the label includes a disclaimer. 196 Products with no
nutritive value that use the same ingredients as pharmaceuticals are slipping
under the regulatory radar by posing as dietary supplements. 197 In a hearing
before Congress, former FDA Commissioner Jane E. Henney testified:
“[P]roducts that contain substances similar to those found in prescription
drugs are marketed for children as dietary supplements. Likewise, products
with ingredients that simulate illicit street drugs are marketed as dietary
supplements to adolescents . . . .” 198 Because DSHEA uses such broad
definitions, many substances that would otherwise be regulated are being
marketed to consumers with little to no agency oversight.199
The FDA also faces difficulties in identifying the cause of problems
linked to dietary supplements because supplement use takes place outside
of a health care setting. 200 In its initial enactment, DSHEA did not require
supplement manufacturers to report adverse events to the FDA, a feature
that garnered much criticism. 201 Even though Congress enacted legislation
in 2006 requiring supplement manufacturers to report serious adverse

194. See Interview by Ira Flatow, NPR, with Paul Offit, supra note 186 (expressing concerns
about trusting even low-risk supplements “because this is an unregulated industry, [and] you don’t
know what’s in that bottle”).
195. See Hill, supra note 163, at 378–79 (noting that DSHEA has given manufacturers
leverage to negotiate with the FDA in order to get borderline products, such as cholesterollowering margarine, admitted as a dietary supplement, rather than a food additive).
196. Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 95. Specifically the supplement’s label must state: “This
statement has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration. This product is not
intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease.” 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C) (2012). If an
ingredient is new, the FDA will require a manufacturer to provide “reasonable assurance that such
ingredient does not present a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury” before it allows
the supplement to be marketed. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(B).
197. See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 95–96, 117–18.
198. Statement of Jane Henney, supra note 190.
199. See Hill, supra note 163, at 373–74 (discussing the ambiguity of the definition of the
catch-all term “dietary substance,” which allows items such as shark cartilage to be marketed
under DSHEA even though they do not otherwise “supplement the diet”).
200. See Kessler, supra note 182, at 1743 (remarking that the difficulty in pinpointing adverse
effects is exacerbated in the supplement context).
201. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 201, at 184 (noting a report from the Institute of Medicine
that found that “the lack of adverse event reporting” hindered the FDA’s ability to “monitor
supplement safety”); Hill, supra note 163, at 393 (recommending mandatory adverse event
reporting for dietary supplement manufacturers).
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events to the FDA, 202 the FDA estimates it receives reports on only two
percent of adverse events related to dietary supplements. 203
Even when the FDA learns of adverse events, the proof required by the
statutory scheme is a major obstacle to enforcement action, a feature which
jeopardizes public health. 204 The FDA’s decade-long struggle to ban the
use of ephedra, a substance used in dietary supplements linked to numerous
deaths and over 1600 reported adverse events, has become symbolic of the
FDA’s relative impotence to effectively protect the public under DSHEA’s
scheme. 205 Years of testing, reports, litigation, and state-issued bans
preceded the final enforceable FDA ban of the product. 206 It continues to be
difficult, time-consuming, and costly for the FDA to prove that a dietary
supplement is adulterated or poses an “imminent hazard” to public
health. 207 Furthermore, the FDA does not have the resources to enforce
compliance with even the limited requirements placed on supplement
manufacturers, and many companies decide to risk being investigated rather
than comply with regulations. 208 The statutory standard for marketplace
removal has been labeled as merely “cautionary language” that gives the
FDA no real power to enforce compliance with good manufacturing
practices. 209
II. ANALYSIS
DSHEA removed much of the FDA’s regulatory power over dietary
supplements at a time when supplement use was increasing and replaced the

202. See Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
109-462, § 760 (a)(3), 120 Stat. 3469 (2006) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379aa-1(2)
(2012)) (defining a “serious adverse event” as one that results in death, a life-threatening
experience, inpatient hospitalization, significant disability or incapacity, or a birth defect).
203. Potomac, supra note 185, at 91. Furthermore, dietary supplement companies do not have
to report mild or moderate adverse events or side effects, depriving the FDA of an important set of
information. Id. at 66.
204. See Cohen, supra note 201, at 189 (noting that DSHEA’s enforcement requirements
make criminal prosecutions under the statute rare).
205. See, e.g., id. at 190 (claiming that the “history of the ban on ephedra . . . illustrates
significant enforcement impediments inherent in DSHEA”); Potomac, supra note 185, at 60
(using the FDA’s struggle to ban ephedra despite “overwhelming evidence” of its dangers as an
example of the difficulties of banning a supplement from the market).
206. See Hill, supra note 163, at 381–84 (discussing the events leading up to the FDA’s ban of
ephedra).
207. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (providing the statutory standard to remove dietary supplement
ingredients from the market); Potomac, supra note 185, at 60 (noting that the FDA has developed
other methods to police the supplement industry since instituting a ban of a product is so difficult).
208. Potomac, supra note 185, at 92 (estimating that as few as eighteen percent of dietary
supplement companies are in compliance with FDA regulations).
209. Nowak, supra note 188, at 1067.
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FDA’s system with a weak regulatory scheme. 210 This congressional
preemption led to growth in the dietary supplements industry, 211 but also an
increase in adverse events linked to supplement use212 and a federal agency
which is almost powerless to remove harmful products from the market. 213
Steps must be taken to prevent a similar result in the mobile health app
context.
There are several similarities between dietary supplements and mobile
health apps and the FDA’s struggle to effectively regulate both.214 Because
of these similarities the FDA and Congress can learn important lessons
from DSHEA that can be applied to the current efforts to regulate
MMAs. 215 First, Congress should not significantly narrow the FDA’s
authority over medical devices in a way that leaves the agency powerless to
adjust to changes in the MMA industry. 216
Second, instead of using legislation to prematurely limit FDA
regulation of dietary supplements in a DSHEA-like fashion, Congress
should create a new FDA sub-agency, the Office of mHealth, which can
direct the FDA’s mobile health efforts. 217 The Office of mHealth could be
modeled off of similar sub-agencies and committees, including one created
by DSHEA, 218 but it also must focus on acquiring personnel with expertise
in mobile technologies in order to be truly effective.219 The new Office of
mHealth would address Congress’s concerns about mobile health app
regulation and enable the FDA to provide confident, flexible oversight to
the growing mobile health app industry. 220

210. See supra note 175; Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,690
(discussing the state of the dietary supplement industry in 1993); see also Kessler, supra note 182,
at 1743 (explaining flaws in DSHEA’s regulatory scheme).
211. Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 85 (attributing the expansion of the dietary supplement
market to DSHEA).
212. See Potomac, supra note 185, at 91 (pointing out the rise in supplement-related illnesses
and death). There were four reported supplement-caused deaths in 1994 and twenty-seven
recorded deaths in 2005. Id.
213. See id. at 93 (blaming DSHEA’s regulatory scheme for allowing harmful substances to
remain on the market while federal agencies are unable to adequately police them).
214. See infra Part II.A.
215. See infra Part II.A.
216. See infra Part II.B.
217. See infra Part II.C.
218. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 13,
108 Stat. 4325 (creating the Office of Dietary Supplements within the National Institute of
Health).
219. See infra Part II.C.1.
220. See infra Part II.C.2.
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A. The DSHEA Saga Is Relevant to the Regulation of Mobile Health
Apps Because of Similarities Between Dietary Supplements and
Mobile Health Apps
Because dietary supplements and mobile health apps possess
analogous features, it seems that Congress may be building up to another
DSHEA-like statute, and thus similar consequences could result. First, the
dietary supplement industry shares many features with the mobile health
app industry. Both are multi-billion dollar industries 221 with powerful
lobbying presences in Washington, making it more likely that Congress will
want to appease the industry and keep regulatory barriers to a minimum. 222
Both involve products that can be marketed directly to and used by
consumers without any professional guidance, thus presenting unique risks
to consumers. 223 Lastly, both supplements and mobile health apps offer
alternatives to the conventional health care model. 224 Many dietary
supplements and mobile health apps present little to no risk to users,
making it easier for opponents of regulation to ignore the risks created by
the minority of supplements and apps that could cause serious harm in
certain circumstances.225 Many of these shared characteristics, such as
221. More than 100 million Americans collectively spend more than $35 billion on dietary
supplements. Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Marks 20th Anniversary of the Dietary
Supplement
Health
and
Education
Act
(DSHEA)
(Oct.
27,
2014),
http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/10/hatch-marks-20th-anniversary-of-thedietary-supplement-health-and-education-act-dshea. The mobile health app market is expected to
exceed $26 billion by 2017. Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act
of 2014, S. 2007, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014).
222. See Ashley Gold, Tech Giants Move to Protect Wearables, POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/health-applications-wearables-congress-111299.html
(discussing the lobbying activities of tech companies concerned with regulation of wearable health
technology). Large corporations, such as IBM and Athena Health, support the passage of the
PROTECT Act. Press Release, Senator Angus King, King, Fischer Introduce Legislation to
Protect Jobs, Prevent Overregulation in Growing Health IT Industry (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.king.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/king-fischer-introduce-legislation-toprotect-jobs-prevent-overregulation-in-growing-health-it-industry.
223. Compare Noah & Noah, supra note 187, at 193 (noting that dietary supplements present
“serious risks” because they are typically used without physician supervision or “the ameliorating
influence of expert oversight”), with Dayton, supra note 6, at 721–22, and Krouse, supra note 1,
at 745 (both discussing the risks of unsupervised consumer use of mobile health apps).
224. See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1197–99 (exploring the potentials for mobile health
technology and its ability to “democratize” medicine); Beisler, supra note 187, at 511–12
(grouping dietary supplements in the same category as other “alternative” medicines).
225. See Noah & Noah, supra note 187, at 173–74 (comparing the low risk of daily
multivitamins to the serious risk presented by products containing substances such as kava,
ephedra, and L-tryptophan). Similarly, a medical flashcard app would present little health risk to
a user, whereas an app that controlled the functions or settings of an infusion pump could present
serious risks to a patient were it to malfunction. See MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra
note 1, at 20, 29 (categorizing the mentioned apps in different categories because of their different
levels of risk); see also Paul Brown, Gov’t Relations Manager, Nat’l Res. Center for Health
Research, Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health
Information
Technology
99
(May
13,
2014),
available
at
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widespread use, relative safety, and the potential to offer alternatives to
traditional medicine, are significant because they were cited in DSHEA’s
legislative findings as motivation for the Act and could similarly be used to
support restrictive mobile health app legislation.226
Second, even though the FDA has proposed modest oversight of
MMAs, there have already been signs of pushback from the mobile health
industry and Congress, similar to the backlash seen in the dietary
supplement context.227 Just as the FDA’s regulation of supplements
fluctuated throughout the twentieth century leading Congress to refer to it
as an “ad hoc, patchwork regulatory policy,” 228 the FDA’s attempt at
regulating software enabled devices, the precursors to mobile health apps,
has also been inconsistent and uncertain. 229 This type of agency instability
provides more reason for stakeholders to petition Congress to intervene. 230
Now the proposed PROTECT Act, SOFTWARE Act, and MEDTECH Act
are attempting to place strict boundaries on what types of software the FDA
can regulate. 231 Again, as in DSHEA, these bills’ supporters appeal to
“common sense” and the ways that apps have affected consumers. 232
Moreover, the number of mobile health apps has already surpassed the
number of dietary supplements on the market 233 and has the potential to be

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (noting that even though the MMA Guidance characterized the risk of mobile health apps as
“generally low” “doesn’t mean they are all low”).
226. Compare Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, §
2(10), (12)(A), 108 Stat. 4325 (mentioning increased consumer reliance on nontraditional
healthcare and the dietary supplements industry’s “integral” place in the economy), with
Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007, 113th Cong.
§ 2(a) (2014) (commenting similarly on the expansion of mobile health apps and their
transformative potential).
227. See supra notes 170–180 and accompanying text; Cortez, supra note 43, at 1216–17
(commenting that the FDA has been “upbraided by skeptical members of Congress for daring to
regulate [medical apps]”). Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the authors of DSHEA, also introduced the
MEDTECH Act. Bowman, supra note 134.
228. DSHEA § 2.
229. Cortez, supra note 43, at 1220–23 (describing the beginning and eventual demise of the
FDA’s Draft Software Policy and ultimately concluding that “[s]oftware does not stand on terra
firma with the FDA”). Furthermore, the FDA has already made changes in its MMA regulatory
approach since the release of the MMA Guidance. See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying
text.
230. See, e.g., Letter from Access Integrity, supra note 30, at 1 (asking Congress to provide
statutory clarity for mobile health regulation).
231. See supra Part I.A.3.
232. Fischer & King, supra note 10 (“We believe Congress must act and codify the common
sense that you can’t regulate new technology with old rules.”).
233. There are now over 100,000 available mobile health apps, RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, supra
note 2, at 7, and approximately 55,000 different dietary supplements as of 2013, Dietary
Supplement Label Database (DSLD), NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF DIETARY
SUPPLEMENTS, http://ods.od.nih.gov/Research/Dietary_Supplement_Label_Database.aspx (last
visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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more transformative to health care.234 For these reasons, the pressure on
Congress to promote innovation and consumer access to mobile health apps
will likely be as strong as it was prior to the enactment of DSHEA. 235
Overall, these similarities demonstrate that it is very possible that
Congress could again preempt the FDA as it did with DSHEA and that the
negative effects of DSHEA could forecast the possible negative impact a
similar mobile health app bill could have on both the FDA and public
health. 236
B. Congress Should Not Apply DSHEA-like Preemption to the FDA’s
Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps
The failures of DSHEA discussed in Part I.B. demonstrate that
Congress should not preempt FDA authority in a dynamic, consumerfocused industry. 237 Furthermore, mobile health apps are still an evolving
technology, making them ill-suited to be defined or confined by concrete
legislation. 238 Lastly, unlike its earlier approach to dietary supplements, the
FDA’s current cooperative, risk-based approach to regulating mobile health
apps closely mirrors that suggested by members of Congress, making the
proposed amendments to the FDCA unnecessary at this time. 239 Thus
Congress should not use legislation to limit the FDA’s authority in the
MMA context. 240

234. Cf. Terry, supra note 5, at 751–56 (explaining how mobile health apps have the potential
to disrupt healthcare in ways that other consumer health products do not).
235. Cf. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 372 (recognizing that momentum for congressional
legislation in the mobile health app field is building).
236. Although the proposed HIT-related bills differ from DSHEA, the idea behind the bills
and DSHEA is the same: Congress thinks it can improve the FDA’s regulatory framework and
wants to decrease the FDA’s impact on the field. Compare Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2(15)(B), 108 Stat. 4325 (“[A] rational Federal
framework must be established to supersede the current ad hoc, patchwork regulatory policy on
dietary supplements.”), with Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act
of 2014, S. 2007, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2014) (“Consumers and innovators need a new riskbased framework . . . that improves on the framework of the Food and Drug Administration.”).
237. See supra Part I.B.3.
238. See Bakul Patel, Senior Policy Advisor to the Director of the CDRH, Remarks at Public
Workshop: Proposed Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 74
(May
13,
2014),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (expressing the problem with drawing a “concrete” line to define different types of HIT and
suggesting a more flexible approach to adapt to the “continuous learning environment”).
239. Compare FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 29 (recommending a narrowlytailored, risk-based health IT regulatory framework based on input from stakeholders), with
Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007, 113th Cong.
§ 2(b)(2) (calling for risk-based approach to regulating software that decreases regulatory burdens
and fosters innovation).
240. See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text (explaining how the proposed acts
would remove different types of software from the FDA’s jurisdiction under the FDCA).
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As DSHEA demonstrates, when Congress interferes with agency
discretion it can prevent the FDA from being the protective body it was
designed to be. 241 The FDA is frequently criticized for taking a reactive
rather than a proactive role—for responding to health disasters rather than
preventing them. 242 Proposed legislation, such as the PROTECT Act and
SOFTWARE Act, however, go even further than DSHEA, and instead of
placing the FDA in a reactive role, they completely remove certain classes
of mobile health apps from the FDA’s jurisdiction. 243 This interference
could create problems. For example, removing clinical decision support
apps from the FDA’s jurisdiction would create a huge risk to patients 244 and
“would provide scant oversight to products that might evolve into some of
the more innovative and important mHealth products in the near future.” 245
Furthermore, by broadly defining certain types of software and placing it
beyond the FDA’s reach, Congress may incentivize app developers to
erroneously claim their high-risk apps fall under one of the unregulated
categories, just as DSHEA did with supplement manufacturers. 246
Congressional legislation that delays FDA regulation or enforcement could
lead to consumer mistrust of mobile health apps or even injury caused by a
faulty app. 247
Moreover, the novelty of mobile health applications makes it even
more imperative that the FDA’s authority over MMAs not fall under a
premature, DSHEA-like statute. 248 Unlike dietary supplements, with which

241. See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text (explaining how DSHEA placed the
FDA in a reactive role).
242. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 43, at 1218–20 (critiquing the FDA’s restrained treatment of
software in the past). Professor Cortez gives the example of the first software-enabled radiation
machine, the Therac-25, a device that was recalled after it literally burned through patients’ bodies
with radiation overdoses. Not until after this tragedy occurred did the FDA begin to develop a
separate policy for regulating software. Id.
243. See, e.g., PROTECT Act § 3 (removing all clinical and health software from regulation
under the FDCA).
244. MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66, at 1–3 (discussing
possible risks presented by CDS apps).
245. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 376. Cortez et al. give examples of CDS apps such as
symptom checkers and drug dose calculators and state that “it is crucial that the algorithms are
safe and work as intended—the twin goals of FDA oversight.” Id.
246. See supra notes 195–199 and accompanying text (commenting on the tendency of
manufacturers to market their products as dietary supplements to escape harsher regulations even
though the products may be more similar to pharmaceuticals).
247. See Robert Jarrin, Qualcomm, Inc., Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed Risk-Based
Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 99 (May 13, 2014), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (claiming that patients are exposed to safety risks while the government and stakeholders
experiment with standards and regulations for mobile health technologies).
248. See Statement of Jeffrey Shuren, supra note 27, at 22–23 (testifying that legislation
regarding mobile health apps is “premature” and would risk “lock[ing]” regulation into a new,
untested framework); cf. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 376 (“If Congress passes legislation, it
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the FDA and consumers were already somewhat familiar, mobile health app
technology is relatively new and the market itself is evolving rapidly. 249
Professor Nathan Cortez warns that fixed statutory definitions that anchor
the FDA’s jurisdiction to software as it now exists could cause problems in
the future as mHealth continues to develop.250 Congress should give the
FDA time to effectively implement its proposed strategy, especially since
the FDA has manifested an intention to work with stakeholders. 251 The
FDA can respond to changes in app technology and consumer use of
MMAs more readily than Congress could if the statutory definitions proved
to be inadequate.252 The pervasiveness of mobile technology and general
uncertainty over where this industry is heading should give Congress pause
before it paralyzes one of the key federal agencies charged with assuring
public health and safety. 253
Lastly, it is simply unnecessary for Congress to exercise its preemptive
prerogative at this time because the FDA is taking a limited regulatory
approach to MMAs that aligns with that envisioned by Congress—
something it did not do with dietary supplements in the 1990s. 254 When
enacting DSHEA, the Senate noted that the FDA “twist[ed] the statute” and
“distort[ed] the law” in efforts to prevent the marketing and sale of certain
supplements. 255 Here however, the FDA has not manipulated the definition
of “device” under the FDCA in an analogous way in order to pull mobile
health apps under its jurisdiction.256 Furthermore, the FDA has already
stated in the MMA Guidance that it will not regulate or enforce regulations
against some of the types of apps, such as electronic health records, that the
PROTECT Act and MEDTECH Act wish to officially remove from its

should update the FDA’s authority to better fit mHealth and preserve the FDA’s discretion to
address emerging risks.”).
249. See supra Part I.A.1; see generally Cortez, supra note 43 (examining the technological
revolution of mobile health apps and the challenges they present to regulation).
250. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 376.
251. FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 29; see also Cortez, supra note 71, at 213–
14 (remarking on the “collaborative mood” exhibited by the FDA at its HIT public workshops).
252. Cf. Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1848–50 (2011) (arguing that
lawmaking in a dynamic, uncertain industry can be premature and cripple future innovation).
253. See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 372 (arguing that the FDA’s oversight of mobile health
technology is “increasingly important”).
254. See supra Part I.A.2 (outlining the FDA’s proposed limited framework for regulating
mobile health apps).
255. S. REP. NO. 103-410, at 16, 22 (1994) (“[T]he FDA has disregarded the congressional
intent underlying the law regulating food and food additives.”).
256. For instance, the FDA could have attempted to regulate the sale of mobile platforms,
such as smartphones, by saying that the addition of a mobile health app turned them into medical
devices; instead, the FDA has taken a narrow view by only regulating a small portion of the apps
themselves. MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 12–13.
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jurisdiction. 257 Since congressional interference is not necessary at this
time, Congress should not enact statutes, such as the proposed PROTECT
Act, that interfere with the types of software and apps that fall under the
FDA’s jurisdiction. 258 To do so would risk the serious consequences which
followed DSHEA’s preemption of FDA authority over dietary
supplements. 259
C. Alternative to Premature Preemption by Congress: Create an
Expert Sub-Agency on Mobile Health Apps
Although this Comment argues that DSHEA provides examples of
what Congress should not do in its quest to promote mHealth innovation,
DSHEA does offer one positive lesson that Congress should pursue as an
alternative to preemption. Instead of creating new statutory definitions that
unnecessarily limit the FDA’s discretion in an unfamiliar industry,
Congress should create an expert sub-agency within the FDA—the Office
of mHealth. 260 The Office of mHealth can lead the agency in its efforts to
regulate MMAs and model itself on other sub-agencies or committees,
including the Office of Dietary Supplements, created by DSHEA. 261 By
creating an office with the requisite technical expertise, Congress will
enable the FDA to provide effective, up-to-date regulation suitable to a
dynamic industry while avoiding the pitfalls of DSHEA. 262
1. The Office of mHealth
This Comment is not the first to suggest some sort of department or
office dedicated to software or mobile health within the FDA. 263 In fact,
257. Id. at 16 (placing electronic health records in the enforcement discretion category).
Moreover, the FDA already declared that it will not enforce regulations of MDDS, MDDS
GUIDANCE, supra note 118, which would fall under the PROTECT Act’s definition of “clinical
software,” MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66. Likewise, the
MEDTECH Act proposes removal of administrative software and products intended to be used for
health and fitness outside of the clinical setting, Medical Electronic Data Technology
Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act S. 2977, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014), but the FDA already
stated that it does not consider these types of software to fall under the mobile medical app
category and thus will not regulate them, MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 21,
25.
258. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
259. See supra Part I.B.3.
260. Cf. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 13,
108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 287c-11 (2012)) (creating the Office of Dietary
Supplements). The Office of mHealth could perhaps be under the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health (“CDRH”), which currently manages MMA regulation. See generally MMA
GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
261. See infra Part II.C.1.
262. See infra Part II.C.2.
263. See, e.g., FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 14–15 (proposing the creation of a
Health IT Safety Center); Scott D. Danzis and Christopher Pruitt, Rethinking the FDA’s
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Representative Michael Honda suggested the creation of an Office of
Wireless Health Technology within the FDA in his bill, the Healthcare
Innovation and Marketplace Technologies Act.264 Although the bill died in
committee, Representative Honda insisted that the funding, interest, and
need for such an office exists. 265 Currently, the FDA has no sub-agency or
office dedicated to mHealth or software, so looking at the structures,
missions, successes, and failures of similar offices in other federal agencies
can provide a guide for the formation of an expert sub-agency for mHealth
within the FDA. 266 The Office of Dietary Supplements, a sub-agency
within the National Institute of Health (“NIH”), 267 and the Federal Trade
Commission’s (“FTC”) Mobile Technology Unit, can be used as guidelines
for the establishment of the FDA’s Office of mHealth. 268
a. Office of Dietary Supplements
The Office of Dietary Supplements (“O.D.S.”), created by DSHEA,
provides a better model than the rest of the Act’s provisions for the
successful congressional treatment of a growing or unfamiliar industry. 269
According to DSHEA, the purposes of the O.D.S. were to (1) “explore
more fully the potential role of dietary supplements” in improving health
care and (2) “promote scientific study of the benefits of dietary supplements
in maintaining health and preventing chronic disease and other health-

Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps, 9 SCITECH LAWYER 4 (2013) (proposing that the FDA
should have an Office of Software, similar to the Office of In Vitro Diagnostics, allowing the
FDA to grow its expertise in the area of mobile medical apps); Email from Bradley Merril
Thompson, Counsel to MRC, to Bakul Patel, Senior Policy Advisor to the Director of the CDRH,
10
(Oct.
19,
2011),
available
at
http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/06/MRC-Comments-on-FDA-Draft-MMA-Guidance.pdf (suggesting the
creation of a mHealth-specific Regulatory Division within the FDA).
264. Health Care and Innovation and Marketplace Techs. Act of 2013, H.R. 2363, 113th
Cong. § 1 (2013). The bill died in committee. H.R. 2363 (113th): Health Care Innovation and
Marketplace
Technologies
Act
of
2013,
GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2363 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
265. See Timothy Hay, Q&A: Rep Mike Honda on Proposed Office of Wireless Health,
VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Feb. 6, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2013/02/06/qarep-mike-honda-on-proposed-fda-office-of-wireless-health/ (“There is money, and there should be
the will. My job is to create that political will. This could create jobs, and help innovators.”).
266. Consumer Updates: FDA 101: Advisory Committees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048040.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
The FDA has approximately fifty federal advisory committees or panels that it uses to obtain
expert advice, but there is no committee established to work solely on issues of mobile health. Id.
267. See infra Part II.C.1.a.
268. See infra Part II.C.1.b.
269. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 13,
108 Stat. 4325 (statutory provisions for O.D.S.); see also Office of Dietary Supplements (ODS),
DIVISION
OF
NUTRITION
RESEARCH
COORDINATION,
NIH
http://dnrc.nih.gov/reports/programs/ods.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (providing an overview of
the O.D.S.).
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related conditions.” 270 The Office of mHealth should adopt this researchoriented mission, especially since the full potential of mobile health apps
has not yet been fulfilled.271 To capitalize on the benefits that mobile health
apps could provide in the professional medical setting, doctors and other
professionals will need to know that the products are safe and legitimate,
just as they do with prescription pharmaceuticals.272
The Office of mHealth could also adopt the duties of the O.D.S. The
O.D.S. Director’s duties include conducting scientific research relating to
supplements, collecting results from that research, and serving as principal
advisor to the Secretary of Health and other agency directors on issues
relating to dietary supplements.273 Because mobile health apps and HIT fall
under the regulatory jurisdiction of many federal agencies, it would be
prudent to have a well-informed individual, the Director of the Office of
mHealth, to serve as an advisor within the FDA and to collaborate with
other agencies engaged in regulating mHealth and HIT, such as the ONC,
FCC, and FTC. 274 The O.D.S. is made up of fifteen programs, each of
which interacts with one or more stakeholder communities including
research investigators, educators, health practitioners, educational
institutions, food-related industries, consumer and public interest groups,
and members of the public. 275 Similarly, the Office of mHealth should
create different programs aimed at working with different stakeholders,
such as patient advocacy groups, health care professionals, app developers,
mobile technology companies, legal professionals, and consumer interests
groups. 276 This approach would continue the collaborative environment
already begun by the FDA in the mobile health app context.
b. FTC’s Mobile Technology Unit
The FTC’s Mobile Technology Unit (“M.T.U.”) provides another
possible model for the Office of mHealth since it was created specifically to
270. DSHEA § 13.
271. See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 372–73 (explaining the transformative potential of
mobile health apps).
272. See id. at 376 (claiming that without FDA oversight, doctors are put in a “precarious
position” because they will not know whether they can trust what apps tell them).
273. DSHEA § 13(c).
274. Congress instructed the FDA, FCC, and ONC to work together on a HIT regulatory
framework. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–
144, § 618, 126 Stat. 993 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
275. See Budget, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS,
http://ods.od.nih.gov/About/Budget.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (describing the O.D.S.
programs).
276. The FDASIA Workgroup provides a good representation of the types of stakeholders
mentioned who could contribute to the Office of mHealth. For a membership list see FDASIA,
http://www.healthit.gov/FACAS/health-it-policy-committee/hitpcHEALTHIT.GOV,
workgroups/fdasia (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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address mobile technologies.277 Realizing the growing prevalence of
deceptive practices in the app world, the unit was created to harness the
technological expertise needed to exercise the FTC’s jurisdiction, an
approach the FDA should follow. 278 In addition to holding public
workshops and creating educational materials and reports on mobile finance
issues, the unit acts as a resource for the FTC as it develops policies and
regulatory guidance that relate to mobile technology. 279 Likewise, the
Office of mHealth should include an educational component to bring
awareness to the public and the FDA about the risks and benefits of MMAs,
a goal discussed in the FDASIA Health IT Report. 280 The M.T.U. also
incorporates an enforcement aspect by examining mobile products and
identifying parties who engage in unfair practices for enforcement action. 281
Because of its lack of personnel and resources, the M.T.U. concentrated on
filing complaints against highly visible actors, such as Facebook and
Snapchat, in order to set enforcement precedents for the rest of the app

277. The M.T.U. is organized under the Bureau of Consumer Protection’s Financial Practices
group. Division of Financial Practices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-financial-practices
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2015).
278. Peter Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive, Toothless, WIRED
(June 28, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/06/ftc-fail/ (explaining the creation of the M.T.U. to
oversee the expanding mobile phone sector).
279. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, MARKETING YOUR MOBILE APP: GET IT RIGHT FROM
THE START, (2013), available at http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus81-marketing-your-mobileapp (providing information to app developers about good privacy and data collection practices);
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Understanding Mobile Apps, ONGUARDONLINE.GOV (June 2011),
http://www.onguardonline.gov/articles/0018-understanding-mobile-apps (giving basic information
to consumers about mobile apps and privacy concerns).
280. FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 22–24 (explaining goals to “creat[e] [] an
environment of learning and continual improvement” in the realm of HIT).
281. Division of Financial Practices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-financial-practices
(last
visited Jan. 8, 2015) (describing the role of the M.T.U.). Already, the FTC has brought
enforcement actions against mobile app developers and negotiated settlements with app providers
such as Google in order to make them establish privacy policies for all mobile services. FED.
TRADE COMM’N, PAPER, PLASTIC . . . OR MOBILE?: AN FTC WORKSHOP ON MOBILE PAYMENTS
2 (2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/paper-plastic-ormobile-ftc-workshop-mobile-payments/p0124908_mobile_payments_workshop_report_02-2813.pdf.
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industry. 282 The Office of mHealth could follow a similar strategy in order
to maximize its own limited resources.283
Although the M.T.U.’s aspirations provide a good model for the FDA
to follow, the reality of the M.T.U. also provides an example of pitfalls to
avoid—namely, the M.T.U. suffers from a lack of resources and
experienced personnel. 284 For example, the M.T.U. consists merely of six
people, including only one technologist, which seems very inadequate when
compared to the type of expertise present in the regulated industry itself. 285
This is exactly the image of impotency that the FDA wants to avoid;
therefore, the Office of mHealth should include personnel with expertise in
HIT and app development who can ferret out bad actors.286
In summary, the Office of mHealth, though similar to the offices
suggested by the FDASIA Health IT Report and the Healthcare Innovation
and Marketplace Technologies Act, could also borrow features from
existing offices, such as the M.T.U. and the O.D.S. The Office first needs
to gather expertise in the area of mobile technologies, and then leverage this
expertise through different enforcement techniques. 287 The Office of
mHealth could be established by legislation, such as Healthcare Innovation
Marketplace Technologies Act, and would help the mobile health app
industry navigate the often confusing regulatory process, something that
would appeal to many regulated parties and members of Congress who
want to simplify this process. 288
282. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It
Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceivedconsumers-failing-keep (describing the FTC’s case against Facebook); Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False
(May 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-ftccharges-promises-disappearing-messages-were (describing the FTC’s case against Snapchat, an
app that allows the user to send pictures).
283. Cf. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (explaining that the FDA needs more resources in
order to keep up with its growing responsibility over MMAs).
284. Maass, supra note 278 (“But the agency’s ambitions are clipped by a lack of both
funding and legal authority, reflecting a broader uncertainty about the role government should
play in what is arguably America’s most promising new industry.”).
285. See id. (“For the FTC, the unit represents an important allocation of resources to protect
the privacy rights of more than 100 million smartphone owners in America. For Silicon Valley, a
six-person team is barely a garage startup.”).
286. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (“With potentially thousands of mHealth products
under the FDA’s domain, agency authority will be undermined if the FDA cannot enforce its
requirements. The agency needs additional funding and in-house technical expertise to oversee
the ongoing flood of mHealth products.”).
287. Id.
288. See Neil Versel, Bill Would Create FDA Office of Mobile Health, HHS Support for App
Developers, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Sept. 28, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/18580/bill-wouldcreate-fda-office-of-mobile-health-hhs-support-for-app-developers/ (interviewing an officer of a
startup health app company who expressed hope that a FDA Office of Mobile Health “could help
smaller companies like his navigate the ‘confusing’ and often expensive regulatory process”).

2015]

MOBILE HEALTH APPS
2.

959

The Office of mHealth Could Address Barriers to Effective
Regulation

The creation of the Office of mHealth could address and overcome
several critiques of FDA regulation that led some stakeholders and
members of Congress to be concerned about the agency’s capabilities,
including the FDA’s lack of expertise in mobile technologies,289 the
agency’s inability to keep pace with the fast-evolving technological
sector, 290 and the FDA’s inadequate or nonexistent enforcement methods.291

289. See infra Part II.C.2.a.
290. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
291. See infra Part II.C.2.c.
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a. Lack of Expertise
The Office of mHealth could rectify the FDA’s lack of expertise in
mobile technologies, specifically mobile health apps.292 Although the FDA
has been regulating medical device software since the 1980s, mobile health
apps have not been in existence long enough for the agency to have
acquired sufficient experience with them. 293 The shortage of expert
personnel, or “brain drain” within government agencies is problematic,
especially for an agency charged with overseeing an innovative field.294
Without knowledgeable experts sitting on agency review panels and
evaluating regulatory proposals, the public, Congress, and the courts will
have little faith in the decisions the agency makes. 295
This shortage of expertise is true for the underfunded and frequently
criticized FDA. 296 Within the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological
Health (“CDRH”), which oversees MMA regulation, reviewer and manager
turnover is almost twice that of the FDA’s other centers. 297 This turnover is
problematic because as the number of increasingly sophisticated and
ambitious MMAs grows, so will the need for regulators with mobile app
experience. 298 An understanding of medical devices alone is not enough;
rather, the FDA needs the input of individuals and organizations with
knowledge and experience of systems of information technology, mobile

292. See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1206 (“FDA is well aware that it lacks technical expertise
on mobile technologies.”); Hay, supra note 265 (comparing the FDA’s lack of familiarity with
mobile health technologies to the judiciary’s inexperience during early lawsuits involving
technology).
293. See MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 6 (giving the background of the
FDA’s history of regulating software).
294. Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law Misunderstands How Government Works:
The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 11 (2013).
295. See id. at 25 (“As politicians and others denigrate the agencies, talented people no longer
want to work for the government and the government loses expertise. As the government loses
expertise, there is less reason for the public to accept its judgments. And as the public grows more
distrustful of the agencies, they become less attractive places to work and talented people do not
want to work there.”).
296. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 n.11 (2009) (documenting reports of the FDA’s
inability to fulfill its responsibilities due to underfunding and lack of resources and “serious
scientific deficiencies”). Peter Barton Hutt, former FDA Chief Counsel, warned, “F.D.A. has
become a paradigmatic example of the ‘hollow government’ syndrome—an agency with expanded
responsibilities, stagnant resources, and the consequent inability to implement its statutory
mandates.” Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008).
297. Beth Simone Noveck, If We Only Knew What We Know: Open Regulatory Review at the
FDA, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 545, 551–52 (2014).
298. See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (calling for more expertise within the FDA to
handle mHealth); Noveck, supra note 297, at 553 (“The proliferation of mobile health devices
such as heart monitors that leverage the sensors in a cellphone has further complicated the
regulatory process and driven the demand for more knowledgeable and effective regulatory
review.”).
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apps, and their application to medicine. 299 By creating an office of
personnel with the requisite technological knowledge to draw from, the
FDA will no longer be dependent on external advisors or temporary
workshops like the one formed to make the FDASIA Health IT Report,
which slows down the regulatory process. 300 A more permanent, internal
entity with actual regulatory authority, such as the Office of mHealth, can
provide stability and clarity within and without the agency, making further
congressional intervention unnecessary. 301
b. Tension Between Fast-paced Innovation and Regulation
Another objection to FDA regulation of MMAs is that slow-moving
regulatory processes are obstacles for fast-paced technology, but an Office
of mHealth can help to mitigate this problem. 302 The tension between
innovation and regulation is a major theme in the literature surrounding
FDA regulation. 303 FDA clearance of medical devices inevitably frustrates
an app manufacturer’s desire to quickly reach the market before a
competitor. 304 For example, the average clearance time for a mobile
medical application is 110 days, but this may be preceded by several years
of discussions. 305 One app creator believes that creating an FDA-approved
MMA would cost ten times the amount of creating one that did not need
FDA approval. 306 When faced with these potential delays and costs, many

299. See Jeffrey Shuren, Dir. of the CDRH, FDA, Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed
Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 11 (May 13, 2014),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (“[W]e deal with product that doesn’t stand in isolation, but is part of a system, and really
systems within systems.”).
300. See Noveck, supra note 297, at 551 (discussing how the FDA’s reliance on external
expertise contributes to slower review of medical devices).
301. See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (“A dedicated center would also help to build
regulatory capacity for a future that will be much more digitized than it is even now.”).
302. See Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007,
113th Cong. § 2 (2014) (“Clinical and health software innovation cycles evolve and move faster
than the existing regulatory approval processes.”).
303. See, e.g., Fischer & King, supra note 10 (“The FDA’s work is important, but its
processes are often painstakingly slow and based on outdated assumptions. This halting
regulatory pace, along with a lack of bureaucratic incentives to embrace disruptive technological
change, has often held back progress.”); Franzen, supra note 7 (asking whether the FDA can
regulate “phony medical apps without killing innovation”).
304. FELLAY, supra note 5, at 7–8 (“With 20,000 applications being added to the Apple Store
each month, competition for consumers’ attention and for their wallets is fierce. Application
developers need to engage in marketing efforts and receive consumer feedback to promote their
products, but they cannot do so until they have received FDA clearance.”).
305. Id. It took the FDA four years to clear MIMvista, a diagnostic imaging app. Id. at 8.
306. Lauren Silverman, Your Smartphone Will See You Now: The Wild West of Medical Apps,
KERA BREAKTHROUGHS (Aug. 12, 2014), http://breakthroughs.kera.org/the-smartphone-will-seeyou-now-medical-apps-have-lawyers-doctors-worried/.
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app developers prefer to release their apps elsewhere, such as Europe or
South Korea, where the regulatory schemes are more favorable. 307 Without
maximizing speed and efficiency in its regulatory approach, the FDA risks
diverting promising and beneficial apps from the American public.308
The FDA acknowledges this problem, and in an interview, Bakul
Patel, a Senior Policy Advisor within the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health, stated that the MMA Guidance actually “scale[d]
back” the FDA’s regulatory reach to make more room for innovation. 309 A
streamlined office staffed with both medical and technical experts should be
able to make the premarket approval process more efficient.310
Additionally, the personnel with mobile app backgrounds should be able to
better understand the goals and motivations of other mobile health app
manufacturers and developers, creating a more harmonious regulatory
environment. 311 While some delay is inevitable, ultimately, an Office of
mHealth dedicated to facilitating FDA oversight of MMAs will likely
encourage, not stifle, innovation.312
c. Lack of Enforcement Power
Lastly, the Office of mHealth would need to be vested with authority
to enforce and implement its policies and regulations in order to overcome
the failings identified both in the dietary supplement context and the
regulatory world at large. 313 Several stakeholders have questioned how the
307. See FELLAY, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that large companies such as Samsung often
introduce their mobile health products abroad well before breaking into the United States market).
Some app developers will simply change the intended use of their product and “experiment[] with
less-regulated markets,” such as veterinary science, to escape the FDA regulations. Id.
308. See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 417 (2007) (“In some settings, a particular regulatory beneficiary’s loss of
expected benefits may not be as serious as the loss suffered by a regulated entity possibly facing
fines or stringent permit requirements. In other settings, however, such as those involving health,
beneficiary losses might be the significant ones.”).
309. Greg Slabodkin, FDA’s Bakul Patel: For Mobile Medical Apps, Patient Safety First,
HEALTHCARE
(May
23,
2013),
FIERCEMOBILE
http://www.fiercemobilehealthcare.com/story/fdas-bakul-patel-mobile-medical-apps-patientsafety-first/2013-05-23.
310. Cf. Noveck, supra note 297, at 567 (concluding that by bringing in the right kinds of
experts, the FDA will be able to make quicker and better decisions).
311. Cf. Cortez, supra note 43, at 1206. Cortez commented on the lack of FDA expertise in
mobile technology and the app developers’ ignorance of federal regulations exhibited in an FDAhosted public workshop. Id. A good way to remedy this disconnect, then, would be with
individuals who understand both the world of mobile technology and the world of the FDA and
administrative law.
312. See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (“Congress must recognize that robust FDA
oversight is not necessarily incompatible with innovation in the mHealth industry. In fact, the
industry’s long-term potential may depend on it.”).
313. See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1181 (explaining that “regulators will need to provide
genuine oversight, not just cheerleading” in order to fulfill their mandate of promoting public
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FDA intended to enforce regulation of MMAs and expressed concern that
there seemed to be no overarching accountability for bad actors. 314 Even
though stakeholders seem open to different methods of enforcement,
potential tort or contract liability is not enough to keep companies
accountable. 315
As a sub-agency, rather than a federal advisory committee, the Office
of mHealth could be given authority to set and enforce clear regulatory
standards while mobile health apps are still in the developing stages.316 The
FDA should not have to wait for an outside party to discover wrongdoing in
the mHealth sector; instead, the Office of mHealth should be able to
identify bad actors and bring precedent-setting enforcement actions.317
There may be more than one effective enforcement method: stakeholders
have suggested alternatives to fines or recalls, including an official agency
list of compliant companies made available to consumers, a promise of a
faster registration process for meeting the suggested standards, or simply
public shaming of bad actors with inferior products. 318 As one stakeholder
has aptly noted, however, “shame or praise may be incentive enough to
bring in the developer community, but it also may not be. In the meantime,
while it is not happening, patients are at risk.” 319 Therefore, it is essential
safety). Perceived impotency is not a problem unique to the FDA. Cf. Maass, supra note 278, at
5 (“The FTC doesn’t strike fear into the heart of tech companies. . . . They know that as long as
they stay within lax boundaries, it’s unlikely the FTC will bring enforcement actions against
them.”).
314. See, e.g., Meg Marshall, Cerner Corp., Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed RiskBased Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 59 (May 13, 2014), available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (asking “[W]ho is going to be the accountable oversight” “when an event happens” and
explaining “there needs to be some sort of an enforcement mechanism”).
315. See id. (“And whether it is a safety center with teeth or whether it is a nod to the
regulatory, there needs to be something, some sort of a recourse other than a provider or a
consumer’s private rights of action through contract or tort law.”). It is likely that many start up
app developers would not have the funds to make pursuing certain tort or contract suits
worthwhile.
316. See id. at 9 (advocating that the FDA needs to quickly develop an enforcement method to
apply in the HIT sector, and ultimately, “[t]he results must be more than words on paper”).
317. See supra notes 281–282 and accompanying text (discussing the M.T.U.’s method of
enforcing privacy standards in the app world); see also Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (“As
experience with the dietary-supplement market has shown, manufacturers will have few incentives
to comply with FDA requirements that lack enforcement teeth.”).
318. See Joel White, Executive Dir., Health IT Now Coalition, Remarks at Public Workshop:
Proposed Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 92–93 (May
13,
2014),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (suggesting positive and negative incentives for industry accountability and enforcement).
319. Robert Jarrin, Qualcomm, Inc., Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed Risk-Based
Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 99 (May 13, 2014), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf.
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that the FDA’s regulatory scheme for MMAs include ways to ensure
compliance, and the Office of mHealth would be uniquely situated to
determine the best methods for such a regime.
III. CONCLUSION
The question of how the FDA should regulate mobile health apps
without sacrificing innovation or public safety is an important one currently
being considered by federal agencies, stakeholders, and Congress. 320
Although some industry lobbyists want Congress to use legislation to limit
the FDA’s authority over mobile health apps, this type of statutory
preemption is premature because the industry is still evolving and the FDA
needs flexibility to be able to respond adequately to new risks to patients
and consumers. 321 When Congress limited FDA authority over dietary
supplements, another consumer-oriented industry, with the enactment of the
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, the result was
increased risk to consumers and an agency that was unable to effectively
respond. 322 Because of the similarities between mobile health apps and
dietary supplements, DSHEA offers an important model of what can
happen if Congress again uses a statute to interfere with agency
discretion. 323 Instead of taking regulatory jurisdiction from the FDA,
Congress should form a mobile health focused sub-agency, the Office of
mHealth, within the FDA. 324 This is a better approach because such an
office would equip the FDA with the expertise and tools necessary to
overcome regulatory barriers and to be an effective and efficient mobile
medical app regulator. 325
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